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ABSTRACT 
 
 
THE WINE TRADE, PIRACY AND MARITIME CONTRACT LAW IN LATE 
MEDIEVAL SOUTHAMPTON 
 
Pamuk, Fatih 
MA, Department of History 
Supervisor: Assistant Professor Dr. David Thornton 
June, 2014 
 
 
 In late medieval Southampton, wine was a commodity, which was 
extensively traded, and quite precious to the pirates of the English Channel because it 
was easy to sell and the vessels loaded with wine had less protection than the ships of 
precious metals. Therefore, increase of wine trade in the late medieval Southampton 
made piracy of the time more frequent. For the wine merchants of both Southampton 
and England, it was a natural reaction to try to avoid piratical attacks by taking legal 
measures against them. This would make piracy, as one of the biggest threats to 
commercial maritime activities, one of the factors that causes the development of 
anti-piracy legal regulations. The purpose of this thesis is verifying this correlation 
between wine trade, piracy and the maritime contract law by especially focusing on 
fifteenth century Southampton. As the title mentions, this work takes three sets of 
source as the backbones of this research to determine the links between the 
commercial, criminal and legal spheres: The port books of Southampton were used 
as the basic sources for the late medieval wine trade section of the thesis. A database 
of over one thousand items was prepared and examined to reach two conclusions, 
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one relating to the nature of the wine trade and the other relating to the Southampton 
merchant-elites. To reach correlation centered conclusions in the sections on piracy 
and maritime contract law, singular accounts and the maritime codes of late medieval 
England were used, as well as secondary sources. The results of this research shows 
the dominance of bureaucrats over the fifteenth century Southampton wine trade, 
their dual identity as privateers, the continuous existence of pirates in the English 
Channel and the improvement of general maritime law (admiralty law), is 
demonstrably related to piracy, rather than maritime contract law specifically. 
Keywords: Southampton, Wine trade, Piracy, Privateering, Maritime contract law, 
Admiralty law, The Port Book of Southampton, The Black Book of the Admiralty, 
The Rolls of Oléron.  
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ÖZET 
 
 
GEÇ ORTAÇAĞ SOUTHAMPTON‟UNDA ġARAP TĠCARETĠ, DENĠZ 
HAYDUTLUĞU VE DENĠZ KONTRAT HUKUKU 
 
Pamuk, Fatih 
Yüksek Lisans, Tarih Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yardımcı Doçent Dr. David Thornton 
Haziran 2014 
 
 
 Geç Ortaçağ Southampton‟unda Ģarap, ticareti sıklıkla yapılan ve ManĢ 
Denizi deniz haydutları tarafından kolay satılabildiği için ve taĢıyan teknelerin 
kıymetli metalleri taĢıyanlara göreli olarak daha az koruma sahibi oldukları için 
değerli olan bir ticari maldır. Yani geç Ortaçağ Southampton‟unda Ģarap 
ticaretindeki artıĢ deniz haydutluğunun sıklaĢmasına sebep olmuĢtur. 
Southampton‟lu ve Ġngiliz Ģarap tüccarları bakımından deniz haydutluğu saldırılarına 
karĢı hukuki önlemler geliĢtirmek doğal bir korunma reaksiyonu haline gelmiĢtir. Bu 
durum, ticari deniz aktiviteleri için en büyük tehlike olan deniz haydutluğunu, bu suç 
karĢıtı hukukun geliĢme nedenlerinden biri haline getirmiĢtir. Bu tezin amacı, Ģarap 
ticareti, deniz haydutluğu ve deniz kontrat hukuku arasındaki bağlantıyı geç Ortaçağ 
Southampton‟una odaklı olarak ortaya koymaktır. Ticari, suç tabanlı ve hukuki 
olmak kaydı ile üç alanı bağlamak için, üç ayrı birincil kaynaklar bütünü bu tezin 
omurgası görevini görmüĢtür; Ġlk olarak Southampton liman kayıtları, tezin Ģarap 
ticareti bölümü için ana kaynak olarak kullanılmıĢtır. Biri Ģarap ticaretinin doğası ile, 
diğeri ise Southampton‟daki elit tüccarlar ile ilgili olmak üzere iki sonuca ulaĢmak 
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için bin verinin üzerinde bilgi içeren bir veritabanı hazırlanmıĢ ve incelenmiĢtir. 
Deniz haydutluğu ve deniz ticaret hukukuna ait kısımlarda ise, bağlantı kurma 
merkezli olarak, tekil tutanaklar ve deniz hukuku yasaları da ikincil kaynakların yanı 
sıra kullanılmıĢtır. Bürokratların on beĢinci yüzyıl Southampton Ģarap ticaretindeki 
hakimiyeti, bu bürokratların korsanlığı da içeren çoklu kimlikleri, ManĢ 
Denizi‟ndeki deniz haydutluğunda olan süreklilik, ve bu suçun spesifik olarak deniz 
kontrat hukukunu olmasa da genel olarak deniz hukukunu gösterilebilir Ģekilde 
geliĢtirdiği, bu tezin ulaĢtığı sonuçlar arasında sayılabilir. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Southampton, ġarap ticareti, Deniz haydutluğu, Korsanlık, 
Deniz kontrat hukuku, Denizler hukuku, Southampton liman kayıtları, Deniz Hukuku 
Kara Kitabı, Oléron Yasaları 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Commercial, criminal and legal spheres are not local today. International 
organizations determine sets of rules to standardize the trade regulations for the 
entire world and states establish their own criminal laws and a fixed frame of 
contracts which does not change from one part of this state to another. However, in 
the late Middle Ages, all these three aspects could exist locally, although there were 
also general rules for them. This created the idea of finding the roots of relationships 
between commercial threats and the legal measures against them by focusing on a 
local administration. Southampton was an appropriate option for this analysis 
because it was focused mainly on trade, it was continuously under the threat of 
piracy because of its geographical position and it started to create its own legal 
maritime regulations with the contributions of trading bureaucrats and the 
considerable influence of powerful alien merchants predominantly from Gascony. 
This thesis will be based on how the correlation between the wine trade, piracy and 
maritime contract law can be established in late medieval Southampton.  
Southampton is a town located on the southern coast of England, within the 
county of Hampshire. Because of two rivers (Test and Itchen) that pass from inside 
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the town to the English Channel, it forms a natural port with very appropriate 
geographical features for all kinds of maritime commercial activities and also for a 
base location for naval recruitment of vessels, as was widely done by late medieval 
kings of England. So these characteristics made Southampton a center of trade and 
military forces. Like all other towns in England, Southampton has had its own 
peculiarities throughout its history. It was not used only as one of the most 
appropriate points for trade with Gascony or Calais in late medieval times, but for all 
other kinds of trade with all possible locations internationally.
1
 The practicality 
behind the town was its function as a distributor. When commodities came to 
Southampton, either using sea routes or land routes, these were sent to other port 
cities or internal parts of England. Therefore, along with the satisfaction of 
Southampton citizens‟ own demands, other towns‟ needs to these particular 
commodities could be provided through using the southern gate of commerce. 
It was not surprising that the period of the Black Death was not more 
merciful to Southampton than to the other parts of England. The population of 
Southampton decreased visibly, but after an immediate decline, Southampton 
recuperated from the effects of Black Death to maintain its role as the principal 
southern port city.
2
 Wool, cloth and wine carried by English, Gascon, Genoese, 
Portuguese, Castilian and Flemish merchants brought economic welfare to 
Southampton. In the middle of the fifteenth century, when all aspects of commerce, 
administration and finance were progressing in Southampton, the two most powerful 
(after the administrators of Southampton) powers of the second half of fifteenth 
century, in terms of the wine trade, namely the Londoners and the various Aliens, 
                                                        
1
 M. H. Keen, England in the Later Middle Ages: A Political History, (London: Methuen&Co., 1973), 
185 
2
 Ibid.,184-185 
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divided the town bureaucracy into two politically.
3
 However, after this local unrest in 
the bureaucracy, Southampton was able to sustain its welfare by using its 
commercial power until the end of the century.  
Like all the port cities in England, the trade activities in Southampton brought 
a very serious income to the royal government and this increased its importance and 
made the town somewhere to be well protected. However, since it was open to the 
sea and its trade dynamics were directly related with the happenings on the English 
Channel, it was hard to protect Southampton fully from all possible threats. All kinds 
of piratical attempts, the continuing warfare of Hundred Years War and the clash of 
commercial interests between maritime countries created a permanent zone of 
insecurity for both Southampton and other port cities in the same situation. 
Therefore, when the trade activities of Southampton are scrutinized, its relation with 
these complex maritime balances should also be considered.  
Following these commercial events and threats at sea, it should also be noted 
what occured in order to avert any danger on the sea in the law of England and more 
specifically in Southampton. In terms of legal background, England could deal with 
this through a few different branches of laws, like admiralty law, merchant law and 
common law. Unfortunately, cases of admiralty law were not well recorded in the 
late medieval period so these cases cannot be traced in order to make an 
interpretation about these anti-piracy maritime case decisions or unsatisfactory 
maritime contract cases because of threats at sea.
4
 When the issue comes to common 
law and merchant law, it should be noted that these two legal branches have 
interrelated natures. At least for a while, maritime contract law stood somewhere 
between these three legal spheres so it was hard to be sure under whose 
                                                        
3
 Ibid.,187 
4
 Timothy J. Runyan, "The Rolls of Oleron and the Admiralty Court in Fourteenth Century England", 
The American Journal of Legal History 19 (1975), 98. 
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jurisprudence maritime contract law fell. In the last chapter of thesis, different kinds 
of written contracts will be explained and the connection between piracy and 
contractual agreements examined.  
Because Southampton had little local authority until 1401 with Henry IV‟s 
charter of rights, it would not make sense to look what Southampton could do in 
legal or commercial sphere.
5
 The real important factor was what general English law 
determined and applied on Southampton before then. In the fifteenth century, 
Southampton created its own bureaucracy and administrative elite who had political 
and commercial status at the same time.  
“The officials of the gild, in many cases, had certainly functions which were 
beyond those of the original gild merchant, and nothing remained to show the 
distinction between gild and borough, so completely had the gild dominated over the 
old borough idea.”6 In other words, the authority behind the regulation of the town of 
Southampton was owned by the officials of the guild. This intersection between the 
political elite of the borough and the officials of the guild highlights the reason of the 
direct involvement of the political elite of the town to the fifteenth century wine 
trade. This aspect of Southampton elite made them a political and commercial elite 
rather than only an administratively active class. 
The local authority of the town, apart from the royal authority of England, 
started to be granted in the early fifteenth century. It was not in the form of an 
autonomy, which is entirely separate from the rule of England but it was the 
beginning stages of construction of a new county administration that has its own 
                                                        
5
 Colin Platt, Medieval Southampton: The port and trading community, A.D. 1000-1600 (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), 12 
6
 William Page (ed.), "The borough of Southampton: General historical account." A History of the 
County of Hampshire: Volume 3 (1908): 490-524. British History Online. Web. 07 August 2014. 
http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=42036  
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flexibility of conducting political and commercial affairs. It is stated that “From the 
reign of Henry III to Henry VI various charters of inspection and confirmation were 
given, that of 1401 granting further to the mayor and bailiffs cognizance of all pleas 
of whatever kind to be held in the gildhall ('guyhalda') and there finally determined, 
the right of holding court leet and practically self-government.” 7  Therefore, the 
borough administration and officials at the guildhall (some people existed in both of 
these groups) were granted to conduct the administrative (including some legal 
branches) and trade spheres of the borough in parallel which enables a coordination 
to these two areas. 
At the middle of the fifteenth century, the beginning stages of the self-
government of Southampton passed and turned out to be a semi-dependence in some 
aspects and this can be observed from the words  
Further, the town and the port of Portsmouth, 'which port is within the liberty 
of the said town of Southampton,' were exempted for ever from obedience to 
the constable marshal or admiral of England, or the steward, and marshal or 
clerk of the market, who should not enter the town to hold pleas, or hold pleas 
out of the town concerning matters within the same. The mayor was to be 
clerk of the market, and strangers were prohibited from buying of, or selling 
to, strangers.
8
 
The administrative or political offices of the town of Southampton was not tied to the 
same political offices of overall England, but starting from 1445, it was gifted with a 
domination over pleas or the settlement of other commercial or legal disputes within 
the boundaries of Southampton. Therefore, political elite of the second half of the 
fifteenth century should have more administrative power than their counterparts in 
the first half. However, according to the port records of Southampton, it will be seen 
that the political elite of the first half stood as better representatives for the 
                                                        
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Ibid. 
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relationship between the commercial and political local administrations that was 
caused by the interconnectedness between the borough administration and the guild 
than the second half of the century. 
In 1447, Southampton became a county by the charter of Henry VI with the 
word of called "the town of Suthampton and its precincts, shall be one entire county, 
incorporated in word and deed, separate and distinct from the county of Southampton 
for ever, and shall be called our county of the town of Suthampton."
9
 This means the 
power of the local political elite reached its peak with this charter. From this time on, 
the elite merchants of Southampton, who were the holders of highest offices of guild, 
became the administrators of county. This means that they enjoyed the position of 
the county offices within the royal administration of England along with their other 
exceptional local governing rights that were granted to them before.  
Taking these Southampton elites as the starting point, the wine trade will be 
examined in the first chapter. In the second chapter, piracy will be analyzed and the 
state of piracy and privateering observed. As an additional consequence, it was seen 
that the bureaucratic elite in wine trade part also took part in the chapter related to 
piracy not as the ones who were affected or intimidated by the piracy, most but also 
as the pirates who worked on behalf of the king or royal administration to seek the 
maximum benefit for the king on the sea and minimum benefit for his enemies.  
In the first chapter, a quantitative analysis will be done by using mainly the 
Port Books of Southampton. The aim of this research will not be to establish the total 
contribution of Southampton to the general wine trade of England but to show the 
particularities of the town by looking to the wine merchants and their backgrounds. 
                                                        
9
 Ibid. 
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The final aim of this chapter will be to demonstrate the processes of the fifteenth-
century wine trade and connecting this to piracy and the legal sphere. In the second 
chapter, firstly a narrative of fifteenth century piracy will be constructed to identify 
the position of fifteenth-century piracy, its relationship with royal and local 
administration and its effect on commerce. The continuity of the fifteenth-century 
piracy will be analyzed by consulting the Patent Rolls and will be illustrated as 
graphs. Following this, anti-piracy legal measures will be analyzed by looking to the 
singular accounts. In the third chapter, conclusions on maritime and contract law will 
be reached with reference to their relationship with wine piracy along the fifteenth-
century Southampton coasts. This involves an in-depth retrieval of information from 
various primary sources, including the Rolls of Oléron, Inquisition of Queenborough 
and Oak Book of Southampton and in order to assess change over time, the Patent 
Rolls. By this way, proofs of the relationship between contract law and increasing 
piratical attempts will be examined in order to determine whether the development in 
contract law and the increase in piracy were merely events in parallel or whether they 
were related facts that fed on one another. Naturally why this entire examination is 
important and undiscovered before could be seen through the primary and secondary 
literatures that were used to show what these covered and what was deficient in 
them.  
When the issue comes to the wine trade in the medieval period, there are two 
books whose absence could not be imagined for this research. Susan Rose‟s The 
Wine Trade in Medieval Europe 1000-1500 should be mentioned first because of 
putting a broad range of wine trade topics together in a very clear and vivid 
 8 
 
manner.
10
 In her book, Rose provides a clear introduction to the medieval wine trade, 
tracing its origins and development in detail. For example, it starts with the Roman 
wine trade, how they made and conserved wines and in what way these wines were 
carried. She then gives the primitive or ancient approaches to wine production and 
trading, before passing to the medieval wine trade. In addition, its way of narration is 
very organized and controlled in two ways; firstly, it separates the wine trade 
specifically from the basic principles of others and contains everything related with 
the process of wine producing and trading including different taxation systems, 
which were implemented separately in England and France, areas of wine production 
with special reference to why these areas were preferred by wine trade partners at the 
domestic or international level and the risks of wine production and trade because of 
conditions existing in the medieval English Channel. Secondly, its organization does 
always cover frequent reference to the general historical narrative such as the history 
of Hundred Years War. In this way, The Wine Trade in Medieval Europe 1000-1500 
does not lose its feature of being a fragment of late medieval English history and 
because the book has such a coordinated nature, the reader always finds a chance to 
evaluate the importance of wine production and its position in commerce within the 
general structure of war or interwar economies.  
In this research, to comprehend the details of the medieval wine trade in 
Southampton, The Wine Trade in Medieval Europe 1000-1500 of Susan Rose was 
used generally for the basics. Constructing these basics could not be an easy job for 
this or any other research since their nature is very suitable to be ignored, 
perfunctory and -because generally the author wants to underline the advanced parts 
of his/her research- shrouded. In this thesis, at least for the first chapter, which 
                                                        
10
 Susan Rose, The Wine Trade in Medieval Europe 1000-1500 (London: Continuum International 
Publishing Group, 2011) 
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covers the medieval wine trade of Southampton, the basics of wine production, 
taxation and trade have been elaborated to make this information very clear, so as to 
design a step by step organization that could be avoid ambiguity. The information 
given by Susan Rose in a well determined order helps to a great extent in achieving 
this aim by filling the gaps that were naturally left by the primary sources used, like 
the port books and brokage books of Southampton.  
On the other hand, for any advanced research on the history of the wine trade 
in the Middle Ages, the works of Margery Kirkbride James stand out in the current 
literature. She has published various articles on the wine trade of England especially 
the trade between England and France.
11
 She made research port by port about the 
share in the overall wine trade of England to assess which town traded how much 
wine, particularly with Gascon regions. These separate articles were collected in one 
single work under the title of Studies in the Medieval Wine Trade in 1971 and 
became one of the important sources for medieval commercial history.
 12
 Unlike 
Susan Rose‟s work, James‟s articles ignore the elementary information needed for 
the wine trade and goes on with detailed analysis, for example the development of 
the Anglo-Gascon wine trade in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. With these 
kinds of publications, she became the most famous expert in the area of the history of 
the wine trade in northern Europe. Additionally, this important secondary literature 
has an appendix that provides statistical analysis for each port. Although the data for 
Southampton does not exactly match with that which is extracted from the port 
books of Southampton in this thesis, these appendix sections were crucial in order to 
trace the effects of piracy or the Hundred Years War on the wine trade in particular 
years. The appendices could be easily categorized as important contributions to the 
                                                        
11
 Margery Kirkbride James, The Non-sweet Wine Trade of England During the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Centuries. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952). 
12
 Margery Kirkbride James, Studies in the Medieval Wine Trade (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971) 
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commercial literature of the history of the wine trade in addition to the other 
contributions that were made with these collections of James‟s articles. On the other 
hand, Margery Kirkbride James concentrates on commercial or economic history 
rather than analyzing the broader effects on, or of, this trade. She does not explain 
how this commercial process was affected by late medieval piracy and privateering, 
nor does she cover their probable legal consequences. Furthermore, she also does not 
examine the domestic affairs of the wine trade in particular ports. For example, 
although by only looking at James‟s collection one could interpret what happened to 
wine commerce in Southampton relating to England and the Gascon region, the 
domestic mechanisms of Southampton (or any other port) are not indicated as a 
separate section or article, such as what was the position of the bureaucracy of 
Southampton within the wine trade.  
Specifically with reference to the port of Southampton, Colin Platt‟s study, 
Medieval Southampton: The port and trading community, A.D. 1000-1600 has been 
very useful for this thesis.
13
 The first and most important aspect of this book is its 
analysis of the administrators of Southampton, their position in trade and finance and 
the importance of Southampton as an international commercial gateway that stood as 
the first point to stop by. In addition to an historical narrative of the town, the 
development of bureaucratic positions and family lineages could be found in the 
appendix sections of this work and this enabled me to create ties with administrative 
positions and merchant identity. Although Medieval Southampton: The port and 
trading community, A.D. 1000-1600 is an extraordinary piece for understanding all 
the details of Southampton trade, by focusing on the wine trade and specifying the 
topic even further, this thesis reaches conclusions that were not mentioned in Platt‟s 
                                                        
13
 Colin Platt, Medieval Southampton: The port and trading community, A.D. 1000-1600 (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973) 
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work. These conclusions extend to areas that are beyond the scope of Platt‟s book, 
such as Southampton wine trade‟s relations with piracy and legal sphere and the 
attempt to scrutinize this branch of commerce in a more unusual triangular 
relationship. 
Related with the medieval structure of piracy, the most appropriate source 
was Jill Eddison‟s Medieval Pirates: Pirates, Raiders and Privateers 1204-1453, 
which is a recent publication and serves as a good introduction to piratical history 
that also makes reference to anti-piracy laws.
14
 Eddison analyzes the position of 
piracy within the general framework of maritime affairs during the Hundred Years 
War, which allowing one to understand the relationship between war and piracy. She 
tries to analyze sea banditry as an occupation in the medieval period and to 
determine whether it was a tool of the administrations of France and England (in the 
form of privateering) or rather something to be terrified of and to take legal measures 
against. This was used as a starting point for piratical history, its effects on the 
general progress of trade and the kings‟ attitude towards pirates, but because of very 
useful details in this work it also lies as a complementary source for the advanced 
analysis in the second chapter of the thesis. Unfortunately in some parts of the piece, 
the track of progress of medieval piracy was abandoned and a narrative of Hundred 
Years War started to be constructed which reduces the efficiency of its organization, 
giving relatively introductory information in the middle of more advanced research. 
However, from all aspects, it was very beneficial to use this work, because it tries to 
show how piracy affected commerce and what the legal measures taken against it 
were. Generally, as a topic, it was very close to what this thesis will try to show, but 
                                                        
14
 Jill Eddison, Medieval Pirates: Pirates, Raiders and Privateers 1204-1453. (Stroud: The History 
Press, 2013) 
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here this is at a much more micro level (scale of Southampton) than Jill Eddison has 
attempted.  
Robin Ward‟s The World of the Medieval Shipmaster: Law, Business and the 
Sea, c.1350-1450 is another very important source to understand the liabilities and 
legal background of late medieval maritime trade.
15
 This source is not necessarily 
related with Southampton‟s legal situation in respect of its maritime ventures but it is 
a general one that includes information for the whole of England. By using different 
sources from late medieval English maritime law, Ward tried to evaluate how the 
legal procedures evolved, starting with very early legal maritime documents until the 
late middle ages. Although Ward does not cover the wine trade and mentions very 
little about piracy, it gives a solid understanding on two aspects: it construct a good 
chronological account on how these documents changed practicalities in the legal 
world. The responsibilities of the shipmasters ashore and onboard are touched upon 
in different chapters with reference to legal primary sources that help us understand 
the scale of effects of these documents. Secondly, in the introduction and appendix 
of his book, Robin Ward shows versions of these primary documents and gives a 
good translation of the Rolls of Oléron and some parts of the Inquisition of 
Queenborough with his own comments and background information to clarify each 
article further. Although these translations and commentaries stand as fruitful 
sources, these translations of primary sources were not taken as the only reference 
point. Travers Twiss‟s, Robin Ward‟s and original versions were used for both the 
Rolls of Oléron and Inquisition of Queenborough to avoid any subjectivity or error 
that might be caused from using one single version. As a result, The World of the 
Medieval Shipmaster served as a vital secondary source which enabled me to 
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understand all the possible details related with legal world of the late medieval 
maritime arena and helped the construction of the third chapter (which is related with 
maritime contract law) to a considerable extent.  
While Susan Rose and Margery Kirkbride James contributed to this thesis 
with their pieces, the most important sources for the late medieval Southampton wine 
trade part of this thesis are the Port Books of Southampton.
16
 From the four 
published port books of different terms, different analyses have been reached. 
Naturally these port books do not only cover the wine trade but all trades with their 
taxes and other fees. Generally, before mentioning name of each merchant and each 
merchandise that was loaded to or unshipped from the vessel, the information about 
the vessel was given. In a usual record, this information includes the name of the 
vessel, its master and (in some cases) its owner, along with its port of origin. 
Opposite each merchant‟s name, the kind and amount of merchandise, the custom 
and cranage data were given in a row. The Port Books of Southampton were 
designed as port records of local administrators to keep the track of the custom and 
cranage fees that had already been taken or that were to be taken. It can be imagined 
as the record book of a company auditor to calculate taxes and other expenditures out 
of regular profits. In the late Middle Ages, these Port Books were kept either in Latin 
or old French but different editors have translated them into modern or middle 
English and added their interpretations in the introductions to these books. 
The Port Books of Southampton were used to reconstruct the patterns of the 
wine trade in fifteenth-century Southampton. Table 1 (below) gives a summary of 
the data taken from the port books. In Table 1, the first column indicates the source 
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and the fifth column the date to make it easy to find the relevant shipment later from 
that particular port book. In addition, knowing the dates of the shipments makes it 
relatively easy to comprehend when these merchants were involved in the wine trade 
or their yearly success. The columns of “Merchant”, “Vessel” and “Master” are 
designed as separate ones to analyze how frequent by a particular merchant or master 
completed a transaction and what was his total share in the annual wine trade in 
Southampton. As very important items, custom, cranage and anchorage information 
in this database serves to indicate what was the total cost (excluding the payment for 
the shipment) to these merchants and what were the earnings of both local and royal 
authorities from the shipments. Naturally, the “Amount” column shows the 
merchants‟ efficiency and share from this shipment of wines (in one shipment, 
different merchants transacted different amount of wines to Southampton depending 
on the load limit of this single vessel). 
Table 1 
Source Merchant Vessel Master Date Custom Cranage Anchorage Amount 
1469-
1470 
Common 
Book 
 
 
Roo, 
Thomas, 
of Havant 
 
Boat of 
William 
Short of 
Langstone 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
10 
October 
1469 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
2d 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
1 butt 
 
 
In the final version of this database, 1170 wine records were extracted from 
these port books that stand as the representative periods in the fifteenth century. In 
this thesis, the names of merchants, vessels and masters have been kept as were 
written in the port books without modernizing them. Although this modernization 
could be possible by looking to English family names dictionaries, this would take a 
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huge amount of time and effort which was instead spent to construct the models and 
to get a result for fifteenth-century Southampton wine trade. Because of the vital 
place of this database for the first chapter of this thesis and the unsurprising 
usefulness of the port books of Southampton, it becomes one of the vital sources for 
the commercial history of Southampton, and consequently, results that were 
undiscovered before have been obtained.  
As the second step concerning the sources, the working principle in the way 
of researching on piracy and maritime contract law should be explained. In the piracy 
section, the Patent Rolls were used primarily, together with other primary and 
secondary sources. Six samples of Patent Rolls from different periods of fifteenth 
century were chosen to observe the increases or decreases of piratical attempts. 
When it was relevant to research Southampton piracy, the records related with 
Southampton piracy on the wine trade were chosen exclusively, for presentation and 
interpretation. On the other hand, to show the general trends in English piracy, all the 
piratical attempts in these volumes of the Patent Rolls were used, rather than just the 
ones related with Southampton, to comprehend the frequency of sea banditry on the 
English Channel. These primary and secondary sources enable this thesis to draw a 
consistent trend for both England generally and for Southampton.  
My analysis in Chapter 3 will be based largely on a variety of legal sources. 
The development of medieval maritime law is an interesting topic especially as the 
determinants of this particular law (maritime or admiralty law in our case) are not 
discovered entirely yet. The Black Book of the Admiralty is a compilation of various 
maritime legal sources.
17
 It covers a broad range of topics from general rules and 
regulations of maritime affairs and cases to other different legal maritime codes from 
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different periods in history. The origins of the Black Book are not clear but it was 
stated more than once that the original version was written in old French from an 
ancient hand.
18
 It appears that the editors of later, translated versions of the Black 
Book were capable to find the original version but the reference points of experts like 
Twiss and Pardessus were merely these edited versions rather than the original one. 
Still, the Black Book of the Admiralty stands as one of the most important maritime 
legal history documents that provides the general knowledge on late medieval 
maritime law, although its usage was much later, around the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.
19
 Starting from the twelfth century, there was a strong absence 
of codified maritime regulations determined by relevant legal codes. Instead, there 
were only the Roman maritime codes, which survived in an individual article in the 
Codex Justinianus. In later periods, these articles were collectively known as the 
Rhodian Sea Laws, but this was controversial because, although there was the 
mention of Rhodian Sea Laws in the Codex Justinian, no one knew from where these 
laws came originally or by whom they were recorded. Still, for a long time, the only 
legal guide of maritime affairs was mentioned with this name and the Rhodian Sea 
Laws were thought to be the basis of all their successors throughout Europe despite 
the critiques that were made by George S. Potter, who tried to prove the absence of 
Rhodian Sea Law as a separate set of laws.
20
 In the form of a code, it was followed 
by the Italians‟ Amalfi Laws, which is also covered by the appendix volume of the 
Black Book of the Admiralty.
21
 This legal source was designed to regulate 
international trade and to organize maritime affairs within the port by determining 
rules to obey. With the Italian dominance in especially Mediterranean maritime 
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trade, it is not surprising to see that this very first initiative was taken by them. 
Because, where the greatest need is, would be the most courageous to make prime 
attempt to satisfy this need like it will be seen later for the need of a regulating 
maritime law in fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. After the Amalfi laws, as the 
second biggest trader in the Mediterranean region (sometimes first), Spain made the 
second attempt and designed its own maritime code named the Barcelona Maritime 
Code of 1258, and more or less concurrently, France tried to form its own document 
with the Rolls of Oléron.22 Although this statement does not necessarily show the 
direct relationship or correlation between the Barcelona Maritime Code and Rolls of 
Oléron, the possibility of the positive effect of international trade on the legal sphere 
should not be completely ignored. 
The Rolls of Oléron, as one of the primary units in the compilation of the 
Black Book, eventually became the most prominent and most effective document in 
Europe since for the first time maritime regulations were collected together in the 
form of a code and again, for the first time, the liabilities of a shipmaster, both 
onboard and ashore, were arranged. It also covered the ship owners‟ responsibilities 
to each other, to the master and to the entire crew. The Rolls of Oléron includes 35 
articles in Travers Twiss‟s translation but it should not be seen as a standard number 
because there are a few manuscripts of the Rolls of Oléron and each has distinct 
features. Whereas Twiss used the Vespasian manuscript in Sir Robert Cotton‟s 
collection, the Additional manuscript in the Library of Royal Academy of Sciences 
in Bordeaux, the Liber Horn manuscript in the archive of Guildhall of the city of 
London, the Bodley manuscript and Selden manuscript in Oxford, another very 
important man of law, Pardessus, who researched the standing of Rolls of Oléron in 
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detail, used the Nero, Bodley and Selden manuscripts. The reason why these different 
sources are important is each version of the Rolls gave them how the Rolls was used 
in different sections of the medieval times. Twiss and Pardessus helps us to 
understand the role of Rolls of Oléron and how it affected their successors that 
emerged later from the further needs of later periods.  
The Rolls brought clarity for the time that laws of other nations in northern 
Europe, primarily it was embraced by England. It is known clearly from the 
introduction to the original Rolls of Oléron that it came from French territories at the 
time of Eleanor of Aquitaine and Richard I. According to theories there were two 
main original versions, one in French and the other that was embraced by England. 
However, the oldest manuscripts of the Rolls of Oléron disappeared in some way or 
another.
23
 Currently, the Rolls of Oléron can be seen in the form of different 
manuscripts that include various numbers of articles. There were manuscripts like 
Liber Horn, Selden, Vespasian, Nero and others, which were used by different legal 
historians in order to analyze the stance of these Rolls in the entire legal background 
of England and also in continental Europe, but the essence of these versions did not 
change at all.  Thanks to the efforts of Pardessus and Twiss, some of these 
manuscripts were published as separate documents or a few of them were used to 
form one single modern version, such as the one in the Black Book of the Admiralty. 
The idea of The Black Book of the Admiralty came with this document to gather all 
code-like documents in one single compilation to name it as the new code whose 
rules were to be valid statewide.  
Like the Rolls of Oléron, the Black Book of the Admiralty also covered 
Inquisition of Queenborough, Rules or Orders about Matters which Belong to the 
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Admiralty and other code-like maritime documents that stood as progressive 
documentations of maritime juridification attempts. In addition, in the modern 
edition of The Black Book of the Admiralty, in which most of the documents were 
translated by Travers Twiss, there are appendix volumes that mainly cover peripheral 
sources of the main documents of the Black Book. This four-volume edition of The 
Black Book of the Admiralty lies as a vital source for this piece, since it helps us to 
understand the chronological progress of maritime legal documents and it also shows 
predecessors, successors codes and counterparts in other geographies of English 
documents. In this thesis, it is used to enlighten us how maritime law developed and 
how the anti-piratical measures took place. It gave mainly two consequences to us: 
one is related with the power of piracy and privateering on English Channel and its 
reflection on the legal sphere, in other words the correlation between the frequency 
of piratical attempts to the existing primary literature on maritime law. Second one is 
to seek a direct, provable relation between piracy and maritime contract law in order 
to understand whether the fear of piratical captures made the merchants of the time 
more eager to construct more secure contractual documents or not.  
The Oak Book of Southampton (edited by Paul Studer) is another primary 
backbone source for the maritime law section of this thesis since it enables us to 
assess the level of maritime law from generally England to Southampton. Its 
structure resembles that of the Rolls of Oléron and it was designed to regulate 
maritime affairs related with Southampton. The records in the Oak Book started to be 
kept about A.D. 1300 with a primary intention of keeping track of the regulations of 
the Guild Merchant.
24
 It was a system designed by the alien merchants in 
Southampton, who started to establish a unity in the town as an association and then 
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turned out to a force within the local bureaucracy. Therefore, their intention of 
organizing alien trade was a reason for systematical integration in the commercial 
elite of Southampton. While the first volume of Southampton covers all the details of 
the Guild Merchant, the second volume relates to customs, external politics and Rolls 
of Oléron. It was quite useful for seeing what were the similarities between the 
maritime law of Southampton and the maritime codes that were used by the whole of 
England in order to assess if there were any further development in Southampton 
maritime law relative to general ones. 
The conclusion of this thesis will benefit from the argumentation of Michel 
Foucault, not by showing this argumentation as a historical evidence but a theoretical 
framework. Michel Foucault tried to clarify varieties of branches of politics in his 
Birth of Biopolitics and one of the most important aspects related to the politics of a 
state is its inextricable relationship with the economy.
25
 The situation of the economy 
and how the state takes its own share from the existing order of economy stand as 
important matters for a country to sustain its existence. The importance of economy 
was always there and it starts with the Hobbesian concept of scarce resources in a 
state of nature. Thus if one has all, the others would have none. In other words, in 
both Hobbes‟s state of nature and in modern history, what two people (or two states) 
could have should be thought of as a balance. From the pre-medieval times on, states 
or political actors did not tend to share resources or markets equally but tried to 
extend their area to become greater. As the most basic principles of political or 
economic scales, if one state improves itself ten percent, it means the other state‟s 
lack of ten percent. For Foucault, this is the essence of mercantilism, at least when 
we talk about conditions up to the nineteenth century. Economy would thus be a case 
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of stealing the other‟s share or trying to keep your share permanent. In the light of 
the abovementioned framework, the correlation between the commercial and 
political-legal spheres will be concluded by utilizing the results of the quantitative 
(from the wine trade database) and qualitative (legal sources and singular accounts) 
researches in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
THE VINARII 
 
 
 
1.1 The Wine Trade in Late Medieval Southampton 
 
Wine culture and its consumption started very early in history. Probably, no 
other liquor was so widely consumed and no other drink had such symbolic 
connotations with fine dining or religion. In all kinds of history-based literature, wine 
has always been widely referred to, which can be seen both in academic research on 
trade or celebrations and even in most theatrical antiquity illustrations. By the late 
middle ages, the wine trade developed extensively and its consumption reached 
phenomenal levels especially in northwestern Europe and the Mediterranean region. 
One of the most effective ports of English Channel, which stands as the southern 
gate of England, is Southampton. Because this coastal town was involved in the wine 
trade to a great extent in late medieval times, the aim of this chapter is to explain the 
place of Southampton in the late medieval wine trade and to indicate the peculiarities 
of the mechanisms of the Southampton wine trade by using port records. 
Before passing through the details of the medieval wine trade, we should 
know the characteristics of the wine trade in general. First of all, it is necessary to 
 23 
 
note that in the case of the English wine trade with the rest of the world, most of the 
wine, which passed through the port of Southampton, came from the French 
territories that were controlled by England, predominantly from Gascony and named 
as Gascon wines. These wines were of various qualities, but after all, the Gascon 
wines were non-sweet wines which means less rare and less valuable. Naturally, 
because of their value and prevalence, the customs of these wines are easier to 
identify, evaluate and very appropriate for constructing wine trade patterns, because 
of continuous and widespread character of this branch of late medieval trade. The 
sweet wines are rare, expensive, and they generally brought the scent of 
Mediterranean pleasing blithe to England, so because of the appeal of sweet wines, 
the demand could be felt by looking at the reflection in customs and difference of 
transaction amounts. Sweet wines of this period can even be thought of as a different 
segment of liquor, because of different price ranges and custom rates than non-sweet 
wines. After we differentiate sweet and non-sweet wines, it is better to focus on with 
the non-sweet Gascon wines. Gascon wines were the dominant product of the 
general English wine trade in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and of course as a 
result of the Hundred Years War period and its outcomes in French territories, wine 
trade gained further prestige and frequency. It is critical to see that the Hundred 
Years War, with the perpetual shift in the domination of territories between English 
and French hands, and with the traditional but large scale damage of the war to the 
region, affected the late medieval English wine trade profoundly.  
The question of who was consuming wine in late medieval England can be 
answered quickly and easily as it was everyone above a certain level of income.
26
 
Wine was not a drink for special occasions nor it was a liquor that was addressed to 
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the taste of a particular class of English society. In fact, the behavioral circumstances 
related to the wine trade was directly the opposite of this; wine was demanded and 
consumed by everyone without requiring a serious amount of wealth or membership 
of a distinguished segment of the society. Thus, it could be said that wine did not 
carry any connotation or symbolization like it does today as the symbol of fine 
dining. However, even though wine was consumed by everyone who had sufficient 
amount of income, it is better to stress that it has always been under the category of a 
luxury good. It was not a liquor that could be produced at home by anyone in English 
society, on the contrary it should be produced -with the exception of very limited 
number of English producers- and brought by someone from abroad. Despite in some 
periods of fourteenth and fifteenth centuries wine was plenty, it had never been 
unlimited or free of charge. So it seems understandable to put wine under the 
category of luxury goods because it is generally imported and this process of import 
did not go on without a hitch.
27
 
Aged wine was not common in late medieval wine consumption so wine has 
not extended its place to where it is today with aging rare wines and even wine 
museums. Ordinarily, late medieval wine was consumed fresh (at least without any 
process of aging).  
Wine was used as a general drink and it was a requirement for hospitality of 
people and even for institutions. As the most simple examples monasteries were 
generally ordering or trading in wine.
28
 Naturally, because of their distinguished 
circumstances, customs and the cranage fees of these wines were not applied to 
members of some monasteries as they were for other merchants, but the case of 
customs will be analyzed later in detail. Almost the same circumstances were valid 
                                                        
27
 If so, the aim of this thesis would only be a narration of English medieval wine trade and it would 
not be more than a desperate monotony. 
28
 Rose, The Wine Trade in Medieval Europe, 39 
 25 
 
for the members of the clergy. Wine was (and is) a requirement for the Church to use 
in Communion so it was seen as a necessary commodity. Moreover, wine was used 
by the royal household itself with different ways of obtaining it like prisage which 
will be seen in later parts of this chapter. Therefore, marketability of the “wine” (as a 
general term that covers all kinds of wines) was very broad in late medieval England. 
Southampton, specifically, is one of the best places to serve as a microeconomic 
form that contains similar features with the general frame of England in terms of 
consumption trends and markets. 
Commonly, vineyards become ready to harvest in August and September 
depending upon the kind of the grapes. So with the production and transportation of 
wines from Gascon regions to England, we may start to expect entry records of fresh 
wine in late November and December. But where were these wines coming from 
within French regions other than Gascony? This is not a question that can be 
answered by mentioning one single territory but at least one primary place should be 
noted in the Anglo-Gascon wine trade and also in the rest of Europe: Bordeaux. 
Bordeaux can be seen, very simply, as one of the centers of the wine trade in 
continental Europe.  Obviously, Bordeaux wine production did not start in late 
medieval times but much earlier. Apart from convenient agricultural and weather 
conditions of the territory, it was easy to access to rest of Europe by sea or by land, 
so this place was able to create a market after it produced commodities for its own 
market. This southwestern Gascon city has also peripheral regions which were full of 
vineyards and named Bordelais. Certainly, Bordeaux or Bordelais was not the only 
source of Anglo-Gascon wine trade in late medieval period. In every part of France 
one can see vineyards and extensive production of wine but Bordeaux was, for sure, 
the main continental ally of England.  
 26 
 
 Because most of the wine, which came to the port of Southampton, was 
coming from France, it will be a beneficial to examine briefly the production and 
trade of wine within France. In other words, what was the story of Gascon wines 
before they came to Southampton? Bordeaux‟s periphery was very appropriate for 
vineyards, and wine production was embraced as an occupation even by burgesses 
and administrators of these regions. It increases the prestige of wine producing and 
trading occupation and, since the royalty itself had involved this production and 
trade, wine supply was plentiful and continuous.
29
 It was a beneficial production and 
trade for French seigneurs and in later periods of English lords in Gascony when it 
was under English domination, and generally for all the royalty because they had 
some advantages that come from being having ties with the royal administration like 
being primary in the access of winepress and less production and trade expenditures 
with less customs and taxes (or none at all).  
Most importantly, as Dr. Susan Rose has wisely repeated in her book, French 
seigneurs or burgesses had advantages beyond that of any merchant to reach a 
distinguished situation in the wine market than any other merchant even if this 
merchant was experienced or wealthy: Firstly, they had the right to declare banvin.
30
 
This application means that at a particular time of year only one wine could be sold 
in whole market. This means creating a firm monopolization of the market that could 
not be shaken by any potential domestic or international competitors. In addition, this 
also means making the best possible profit because of the utility theory in basic 
economics. Royalty could sell their production when the demand was at the peak 
level both within Gascony and in the British islands. This incredible function of 
banvin was also called ban des vendanges. The French burgesses‟ and seigneurs‟ 
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second great advantage was keeping the right to retail sale of wine. None of the 
merchants had the right to make the retail sale of their production unless they paid a 
toll known as pougèzes. Additionally, taking this right by paying the toll was not 
open to all merchants but only for nobles and foreigners. This seems a perfect way to 
adjust the domestic wine market according to the burgesses‟ desires and royalty‟s 
benefits and it became very useful for Southampton wine merchants in the first half 
of fifteenth century, because in this period, there was English dominance in 
Bordeaux and English lords were arranging the trade in favor of themselves and their 
merchants.  
Another thing to know at the beginning of research into the wine trade 
concern the units of measurement used in the fifteenth century. Units of 
measurement for the wine trade were various: pipe, barrel, hogshead, tun and butt are 
all examples in the records of the port of Southampton.
31
 None of these units of trade 
were internationally standardized. Barrel and butt could be found with different 
capacities so the only thing that can be done for a good analysis is determining the 
approximate capacity of each unit of trade, or at least a range for each. Two 
hogsheads are equal to one pipe and two pipes are equal to the amount of one tun. 
According to Susan Rose‟s assessment, one hogshead is about 238.5 liters, one pipe 
is 478 liters and one tun is 954 liters.
32
 However, these exact amounts of these 
medieval volume measurement units can hardly be flawless. Although we have 
enough data including coming from the port books of Southampton, covering the 
transactions, customs and details like cranage, we can hardly determine the exact 
value of these volumes. None of these volumes were fixed to a standard amount (not 
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legally at least) for the sake of the principle of honest trade like they are today in the 
international trade arena to be within the standards of international organizations that 
are keeping an eye on trade efficiency.
33
 For instance, according to Dr. Margery 
Kirkbride James‟s work, a tun was approximately 900 liters, but on the other hand, 
Professor Renouard states one Gascon tun was between 750-900 liters. Therefore, it 
can be understood that the volumes of these measurements are blurred and also 
relative. This relativity comes from the regional differences between the trading 
countries.  
Furthermore, abovementioned measures were not the only ones. The barrel, 
for example, could be easily found in the records and the volume of the barrel is 
quite controversial, since there were different kinds of barrels with different 
capacities. Even though it is a relatively rare unit in the records of Southampton, a 
butt was another unit used, generally for wines from the Mediterranean region.
34
 Its 
capacity is very close to one pipe, so about 250 liters. By knowing the information of 
Mediterranean origin (from Italian botte) of this measurement unit, when “butt” was 
seen in any record, the wine could be thought or assumed to be of Mediterranean 
origin and possibly a sweet, more expensive kind.  
On the other hand, information related with customs is important as much as 
units of measurement and character of production places. Local custom accounts are 
vital data sets to examine concerning the wine trade in late medieval England. There 
were various kinds of customs in the medieval wine trade that starts with the oldest 
system, namely the prise of wines or prisage. Before 1302, the only taxation or 
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custom system of king was prisage for the international wine trade.
35
 In most basic 
words, prisage is the right of the king to take some of the wine that was imported.  A 
vessel carrying less than twenty tuns of wine was required to give one tun to the 
royal butler. If it was more than twenty, the king‟s confiscation was two tuns (one 
from in front of the mast and one from behind). Instead of taking customs in cash, 
the king was lawfully seizing some amount of wine and since it was one of the 
regular consumptions among the royal households, the benefit stayed as a 
commodity-based one. On the other hand, at the beginning of fourteenth century this 
system changed with the introduction of “New Customs”. 
The change of customs in 1302 was made with the motivation of the royal 
administration to profit mere from the wine trade. With the old system of prisage, the 
highest level of efficiency was making incoming wine and consumed wine even. It 
was part of Edward I‟s series of tax raising policies and law making efforts. Neither 
the legal place of the prisage system nor its profit was enough for Edward I‟s 
perception. Most probably Edward I had seen the popularity of wine trade and its 
firm position as an opportunity to raise funds for his considerable military 
expenditure in the military arena. It would be hard to say that he was unsuccessful in 
this financial maneuver, because with this move the yearly profit of the royal 
household multiplied by twenty.
36
  
After the 1302 change of customs, the tunnage and poundage system was 
embraced in the trade arena of England. Luckily, Edward III inherited his 
administrative and financial abilities from his grandfather rather than from his father 
so he could manage to develop trade regulations (actually the whole legislation and 
governing process) and introduce the tunnage system for the wine trade.  
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By 1401, the fee to be paid as tunnage was 2s. per tun. This custom increased 
up to 3s. per tun for both sweet and non-sweet wines. However, neither the pre-1302 
prisage nor the “new custom” until the reign of Edward III nor tunnage in later 
periods prevented wine merchants from paying more to trade and sell their goods in 
England. When a vessel comes to any English port, the relevant quality and amount 
checks should have been done by the administration for the sake of sustaining fair 
trade. At this level of wine trade, the fee called gauger‟s penny emerges. The gauger 
was an administrative officer who checked each tun in the barrels (at this context, 
this should not necessarily be a barrel but all of the containers like pipe, butt, 
hogshead etc. must be checked). After this stage, wines could be carried into taverns.  
On the other hand, the abovementioned processes were only the general 
custom processes that were applied in all ports of England. There were also some 
regional requirements in particular ports of England, especially in Exeter and 
Southampton.
37
 It should be seen that these additional local customs were not so high 
as to create an unbearable burden on the merchants‟ shoulders. Especially in the case 
of Southampton, these local customs were more likely the results of the financial wit 
of local administrators applied with the intention of exploiting the popularity of wine 
and most of the time these amounts were just drops in the bucket relative to the 
overall payment that was to be made by wine merchants. In Southampton, by the 
fifteenth century, this additional tax was 4d. per tun for each wine that was traded.
38
 
Additionally, if wines were traded within the town and then sent to another place by 
sea to be sold, another 4d. would come up. Furthermore, if the same process 
happened but the exportation of the wines realized through land, its local custom 
would become even higher as 8d. 
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Right along with these costs, there were cranage fees whose purpose was to 
cover the unloading wines from the vessel. When the whole these small customs and 
other additional costs are summed up, the minimum sale price for break-even point 
can be found.  
 
Table 2 
Denizens
39
 
Tunnage 3s. per tun  
Cranage 4d. per tun 
Gauger’s penny ½ d. (½ from buyer ½ from seller) 
Local Customs 4d. per tun 
Total 3s. 8 ½ d. per tun 
 
However, it should be noted that 3s. 8 ½ d. per tun for all the costs of 
bringing wine to England and making it ready for sale was only valid for denizens 
and even among denizens this value could both increase and decrease according to 
the position of the denizen and over time. In this assumption, the hypothetical 
merchant was an Englishman, or a naturalized alien, who did not have any right to 
cancel these administrative costs and had not previously taken any exemptions from 
them. The conditions of alien customs and situation of exempted denizens were 
different and should be analyzed separately. According to Margery Kirkbride 
James‟s assessment of wine prices, between 1427 and 1449, one gallon of wine 
could be sold for 6d. Our medieval tun is equal to 200 gallons approximately. If we 
assume it was exactly two hundred gallons, 1 tun of wine could be sold for 1200d. 
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which means £5. This was a huge amount of money and reflects the reason of the 
popularity of wine trade even there are various kinds of additional costs existed 
between the productions of wine and putting the barrels ready for sale into the 
tavern. Although neither the wine came free nor its transport was costless, wine, as a 
continuously demanding good, was a highly profitable good. 
The profit that was coming from wine trade does not mean that most of the 
denizens became rich but it can be seen that wine trade business could be financially 
beneficial in direct proportion to merchants‟ existing wealth. As it is in modern 
economics, if you invest more, your possible income would be more (at the same 
time, one can also decrease the risk by investing more with a well distributed capital 
investment). Not surprisingly, the bulk of late medieval wine trade by denizens was 
gathered in the hands of a powerful minority. Colin Platt has described this as the 
“rivalry of John Payne and Walter Fetplace Junior”,40 but the situation was a lot 
more than that and the aforesaid minority was slightly larger and the competition 
between Fetplace and Payne varied in different years of the first half of fifteenth 
century. From November 1435 to September 1436, John Payne traded 24.5 tuns of 
wine. On the other hand, Walter Fetplace who was indicated as his rival, traded 10 
tuns of wine in the same period.
41
 In 1436, instead of Walter Fetplace, John Emery 
would be a better choice as a rival with a trade of 28 tuns of wine and he gave at least 
8 tuns of prisage to the king. Among the leading minority, John Wodcok (24 tuns), 
William Nicol (17 tuns), Robert Eylward (14,5 tuns) and William Laurens of 
Patching (21 tuns), who was a tenant of bishop of Canterbury, could also be counted.  
Between 1435 and 1436 the champion of the wine trade was certainly Peter 
James for sure among all of his contemporaries. He had made transactions 
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concerning 56 tuns which means £28042 if we assume all of the wines he had traded 
were non-sweet wines. When we count the fact that his trade relations with Italians 
were quite good and a percentage of this load of wine consisted of sweet wines, the 
total amount might be more than £280. 
Nevertheless, it was a fact of the late medieval wine trade that successors did 
not always sustain the success of their predecessors. It was hard to maintain the trade 
web even for the most experienced traders, because there was always a rival that may 
sail faster than you or a piracy attack may turn all the progress upside down. Because 
of this continuous change of balance, even for the families that dominated the wine 
trade, generally this dominance did not last long and usually the fame of a particular 
family was tied to the success of one member rather than the success of the entire 
family. For example, Roger Norman, Thomas de Byndon, Hugh Sampson, Henry de 
Lym, John le Fleming and Nicholas de Moundenard were notables of the wine trade 
and they brought fame and wealth to their families in the fourteenth century.
43
 In the 
whole Port Book of Southampton of 1435-36, their families are not mentioned at all 
and they were mentioned (some of them) only a few times in Port Books of 1439-40 
and 1427-30. These families could not maintain their power in the wine trade 
because of emergence of other prominent commercial elites.  
A better question, therefore, is how were these trade elites able to remain on 
the scene for a long time? Or what was the mechanism that caused the change of 
these merchant elites in the wine trade in fifteenth century Southampton? To answer 
this question, an analytical approach should be embraced.  
In the first half of the fifteenth century, there was a group which retained the 
wine trade in its hands. By following a reverse methodological path, it may be better 
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to underline what “retaining the wine trade in its hands” does not indicate here rather 
than what it covers. Firstly, the abovementioned prominence does not mean this 
favored group of merchants monopolized the wine market in the first half of fifteenth 
century. As you can clearly see from the information above, the wine trade of the 
fifteenth century was in such a developed and expanded form that nobody could 
impose any control over it for a long time. In addition, the wine market of that time 
could hardly be seen as the scene of a mature capitalism in the modern sense, thus it 
would not be appropriate to focus on themes such as the competencies of relative 
gains of each merchant who involved in wine trade. These kinds of relative gain 
competencies bring a definite hunger for monopolization along with extracting the 
small competitors one by one. Elite merchants of the fifteenth century wine trade 
tended to use their opportunities and positions as much as they could to achieve the 
maximum benefit out of their privileges.  Secondly, it does not mean that this group 
of merchants engaged only in wine trade and no other product. Being major players 
in wine trade is not enough to label them as “wine merchants”, which would be a 
quite limited definition for the aforesaid group of merchant unlike their limitless 
positions (both in economy and bureaucracy) in Southampton. These people 
participated in transactions of different products in different roles.
44
 These same 
people could also be seen as the prominent merchants of cotton, wool or salt in 
Southampton, as the same cadre.  
On the other hand, “retaining in its hands” does mean an undeniable and a 
distinguishable position for these merchants like Peter James or Walter Fetplace. 
They enjoyed standing on a firm ground even when everywhere else was shaking in 
the wine market. The ones who could stand still on firm ground were the merchants 
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who also enjoyed an administrative office in Southampton. They were not exempt 
from every cost in the wine business, but absence of some of these costs, like local 
taxes, reduced the financial burden and made the wine trade a more appealing 
occupation (along with other trades and bureaucratic office). 
  In the Port Book of Southampton for 1427-30, the phrase “with the 
command of William Nicole, mayor” is used to show the source of the order to pay 
rent for a farm to the Queen.
45
 The title of mayor is also used for Walter Fetplace, 
surprisingly (and confusingly) for the same term as it was used for William Nicole. 
In fact, in the same part of the 1427-30 Port Books of Southampton, the French word 
“mayre” was used to describe two separate people. This could be thought as an 
indication that “mayre” was a high-ranking bureaucratic position rather than 
necessarily the mayor of the town. Apart from the confusing situation about the 
office of mayor (and this does not happen just once), it is clear that these people 
should be thought of as political notables in Southampton between 1427 and 1430. 
Thus, as a first step, positions of William Nicole and William Fetplace in wine trade 
may give some idea about the political-merchant elite. Only in the year 1427-28, 
William Nicole traded 35.5 tuns of wine in eight transactions that were done in 
different times of the year. He paid local custom for only three of them but paid 
cranage for almost all of his transactions. He stands as 4% of yearly wine trade in 
1428 all by himself. When it is considered that for the whole of 1428, approximately 
350 transactions were made by over one hundred different merchants, it might be 
easier to appreciate the importance of a 4% share in a year. In 1435-36, a total of 415 
tuns of wine were traded
46
 and from the port records it can be seen that William 
Nicole protects his 4% share even though the wine he transported decreased to 17 
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tuns in that year. In addition, he was in an even more advantageous position than in 
1428 because he did not pay any local custom at all in 1436. In 1440 he proceeds not 
to pay any local custom but the volume that he traded decreased to 10 tuns. His share 
was only reduced about one percent and continued to be noticeable among the other 
merchants who were taking very small bites from the whole.  
Walter Fetplace is another distinct case which is worth examining to 
determine what an political position could provide. First of all, in our three port 
books, which represent three different points in the first half of fifteenth century, he 
never paid any local custom. When we look to the total volume for the three years, 
he should have paid 1£ 4s only as local custom of Southampton. In 1428, 65 tuns 
were traded by Walter Fetplace which means a share between 6-7%. His position 
provides him 12 tuns transaction (3.5 % share) in 1436 and just 2 tuns (0.5% share) 
in 1440 that makes him a member of champions‟ league in the fifteenth century wine 
trade in Southampton.  
Before going on with other examples, which will show the dominance of 
administrators and political elite over the wine trade, an indication of the difference 
between regular merchants and political merchants should be given. It would not be 
wrong to think rest of wine-trading activities as individual attempts at trade with a 
serious lack of frequency or even repetition. On the other side, the political-
merchants, who actually form a business for themselves by using wine, seem like 
trading wine is what they do to live. To put it another way, when political-merchants 
are professionals, who were not doing wine trade under conditions of necessity for an 
additional income but as a permanent secondary occupation, the rest of wine-trading 
merchants is basically sporadic. 
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In the Port Book of Southampton for 1435-36, the same term of “mayor” is 
being used for Peter James
47
 who stands as the main figure in the first half of 
fifteenth century. Peter James was responsible of 38.5 tuns of wine transactions 
(approx. 4% share) in 1428, not paying any local customs. Again by not paying any 
local custom, interestingly he increased his volume to 53 tuns, which means his share 
was around 12%. In 1440, he traded 9 tuns himself and had taken 36 tuns in return 
for Diego of Femado‟s debts, assumedly because of his administrative 
responsibilities.
48
 In the same account of 1435-36, Walter Fetplace was recorded as 
the deputy of Peter James so either Walter Fetplace was a mayor before the term of 
Peter James around 1428, or multiplicity of “mayors” gives us the right to interpret 
the word “mayor” as an high-rank official. 
Robert Eylward is the fourth mayor in total and second mayor of the 1435-36 
term. In an indenture, he is clearly termed as mayor of Southampton which makes 
him worth examining. In the years of 1428,1436 and 1440, he traded 7,14 and 15 
tuns respectively, which makes him the second political-merchant who did not 
decrease the volume regularly. Like other members of the political elite, he was 
paying almost nothing as petty custom (he did pay 2d twice) accordingly with the 
privileges like this, or with his volume, share and frequency of transaction, it can be 
understood that he cannot be thought as one of the rest in wine trade business but one 
of the big names. 
Although Robert Eylward was named as “mayor” in an indenture that was 
recorded in the Port Book of 1439-40, John Emery is also indicated as “mayor” in 
the same year.
49
 This should not be surprising for the readers of these records since 
all Southampton port records of the first half of fifteenth century underline at least 
                                                        
47
 Foster, The Local Port Book of Southampton for 1435-36, 121 
48
 Cobb, The Local Port Book of Southampton 1439-40, 22 
49
 Ibid.,102 
 38 
 
two names with the title of “mayor”. If John Emery was not specified as mayor of 
the town, anyone who read all of the port books could easily say that he had a 
bureaucratic position in Southampton in some period because of the frequency of his 
name in these records and his exemption from taxation and additional fees. In 
addition, the eminence of John Emery did not emerge with the year that he was 
shown as mayor but much before. Throughout the year of 1428, he traded 16.5 tuns 
of wine (of course without paying any local customs) which is a smaller amount than 
other political elite but still a sufficient volume to distinguish him from the rest 
without knowing about his bureaucratic position. In 1436, he increased his volume 
and share tremendously by trading 27.5 tuns of wine (approx. 6.5%) and he only 
gave 4d local custom once on 1 May 1436. In this year, the transactions of John 
Emery and Peter James alone constituted about 20% of entire wine trade of 
Southampton which helps to explain why political-merchants are better to be 
distinguished from sporadic traders. Surprisingly, in 1440 (which is a year of his 
mayoral term) Emery traded only 2 tuns of wine and paid 8d customs for them which 
is the amount he had to pay exactly, therefore the last year of John Emery does not 
show the abovementioned administrator privileges to us and anyone who only looks 
to port book of 1440 might assume him as another sporadic trader of wine.  
Another notable of Southampton who engaged in the wine trade (and also a 
serious buyer of iron) was John Payne, as you would guess the “mayor”. He was not 
terribly important in the port books of 1427-28 and 1439-40 but he had a transaction 
of 24.5 tuns in 1435-36. Was this enough to see him among prominent political elite 
of wine trade? The answer to this question triggers a series of other answers, which 
are slightly blurred (for example the concept of “mayor”) until now, and requires 
reversing the entire narrative upside down.  
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John Payne did not become mayor of Southampton in the first half of 
fifteenth century.
50
 But in 1435-36 he became a parliamentary burgess from 
Southampton, which is the fact behind his title of “mayor” in the port books of 
Southampton. Owing to this bureaucratic position, his 1436 transaction skyrocketed 
compared to the years without an administrative office.
51
 John Emery was a bailiff in 
1428-9, 1430-31 and 1431-32 and additionally mayor of Southampton in 1433-34 
and 1440-41.
52
 This explains the reason for his great participation in the wine trade 
in 1429 and 1436 port books. His passiveness in 1440 despite of his mayoral office is 
an exception and could easily be rationalized by the possibility of trading other 
products in this year by using his office advantages. Robert Eylward (or Aylward 
with modernized version) was, on the other hand, steward in 1430-31, bailiff in 
1433, mayor in 1436, 1441 and 1449. Therefore it sheds some light on Robert‟s 
relative backwardness in 1428-29 years, with only 7 tuns traded, and also on the 
reason for his serious share in 1436 and 1440 which is easy to tie in with his 
administrative advantages.  
Furthermore, Peter James, as the pivotal name for our period, was a very 
high-profile administrator in the first half of fifteenth century: steward in 1413, 
bailiff in 1416-17, mayor in 1428, 1434, 1435, 1442, 1447 and parliamentary burgess 
in 1427.
53
 When his bureaucratic prominence and success are seen, it is not odd to 
establish the necessary relation between this administrative position and his 
prominence in the wine trade. In direct proportion to the number of his 
administration offices, he never traded a relatively small amount and was always 
among the top three traders (generally the leading one) in our three sample years of 
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first half of fifteenth century. Even tough years for the wine trade or bitter 
competitions with their peer elites did not change anything in Peter James‟s share in 
overall wine trade and most probably he was the one who used his administrator seat 
most efficiently to make some (the word “some” may be a little bit underestimating 
for the amount of cash being mentioned) cash out of it. In addition, in the first half of 
fifteenth century, we are talking about Walter Fetplace Senior (in second half, the 
name will be Walter Fetplace Junior) who was steward in 1412, bailiff in 1414, and 
mayor in 1419, 1426, 1432, 1439 and 1444.
54
 The reason for his importance, 
especially in the middle of first half of the century, was because of this gradually 
rising administrative career and efficient usage of it. Lastly, William Nicole enjoyed 
the same prestigious position by being mayor in 1411, 1417, 1422 and 1427 and 
because of this, he seems very successful in wine trade of 1429 (as our first sample 
year) but then, a declining trend became observable in volumes of his transactions.  
The abovementioned political positions make the word “mayor”, which is 
being used by all port books, clearer by showing us mayor was a term which was 
used for different high administrative office holders like parliamentary burgesses and 
mayors (in the modern sense). Moreover, proportional ups and downs reflect that the 
correlation between administration and trade is a logical and rational one with some 
exceptions and proves that there was political-merchant elite group which held the 
greatest share among denizens.  
However, this proportionality was not the only aspect that made this political 
elite a trade elite at the same time. In the fifteenth century, we should not ignore the 
importance of the foreign contribution to Southampton‟s wine trade. The bulk of the 
wine trade was at the hands of foreigners like Gascons and Italians. Southampton‟s 
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political elites frequently invited these foreigners to work with them cooperatively.
55
 
Colin Platt stated that “In 1402, to avoid the payment of the due known as scavage at 
the capital, they [Italians] successfully petitioned the king for permission to unship at 
Southampton, bringing their goods by road to London” 56  which was basically 
playing into our political-merchants hands, because it meant more to trade, more to 
invite and persuade and more to earn with local dues from foreigners. Events like 
this, expanded the existing importance of these elites even more, and enabled them to 
be the ones who always have a say in wine trade of Southampton.  
 
1.2 Changes in the Second Half of the Fifteenth Century 
 
In the second half of the fifteenth century, a noticeable change in port records 
can be easily observed. These records become well-ordered enough for a systematic 
research unlike their early century counterparts. For any goods coming to or shipping 
from Southampton, it is easy to see by whom it was traded, in which ship, who was 
the master of this ship and the exact date of unloading. In addition, customs, cranage 
fees and poundage or tunnage expenses are indicated in different columns which 
makes it easier to see exceptions. Lastly as the last advantage of the records from 
second half of fifteenth century, the political title of “burgess” exists in them to 
distinguish some of wine merchants from others. This last feature of these port books 
is quite important for the argument of this chapter. If the ones who were labeled as 
burgess traded more frequently and more in volume and if the other ones (non-
burgess) remained as sporadic players in wine trade, then these port records will lie 
as this argument‟s crosscheck by itself. 
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Thomas Avanne is only one of these burgesses in the records for 1469-70 and 
1470-71 but he is the most influential one when we look to the volume of wine he 
traded in these two years. In 1469-70, he traded approximately 50 tuns which is a 
serious amount considering that the maximum volume it could be seen was 53 tuns 
by another local notable, Peter James, in 1435-36. One year later, he reduced his 
trade volume to approximately 26 tuns but stood at the first place among the 
burgesses both in terms of volume and number of shipments. Furthermore, he is one 
of a few local burgesses who used his own ship and by this way was involved in each 
phase of transaction. By all measures, having a ship of one‟s own was a good 
investment in the fifteenth century. Even there was always a risk of losing the ship 
because of unstable weather conditions, piracy or privateering or misconducting, 
generally accumulated total profit was bigger than the cost of loss. Moreover, if the 
ownership of this ship was split among a few merchants, the risk would also be 
smaller and the one time lost cost would inflict less damage to a single merchant. But 
this implementation of dividing the risk into a few pieces was primitive in our 
period, yet still applied by some of the merchants.  
Although Thomas Avanne occurs as the major actor in the port records, he 
was not the only burgess who made serious contributions to the wine industry (and to 
his own wealth as well). John Walker stands as another example of a big political 
elite exclusively when his performance of approximately 52 tuns of trade in 1469-70 
is considered. It is even more than what Thomas Avanne had transacted in terms of 
volume but not in terms of quantity of shipment. However, John Walker makes his 
presence known only in 1469-70 but in 1470-71. Between these two years, there was 
a perceivable decline of wine trade and it can be traced by especially the 
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performances of political-merchants. John Walker traded only 8 tuns wine in this 
year and Thomas Avanne lost half of the volume of last year.  
Considering the port records of both the first and second half of the fifteenth 
century, it can be said that general declines or increases in wine trade are observable 
from trade frequencies and volumes of elite merchants (or burgesses in very general 
port record terminology). Philip Tregas is another member of the political elite 
involving in trade, who neglects this parallelism between trend of wine trade and 
efficiency of these merchant elites. In 1469-70, he had approx. 30 tuns which can be 
seen as an immense amount for a sporadic English merchant,
57
 however, his name 
does not occur in the 1470-71 records at all (in terms of wine trade). Naturally, this 
might mean two things: if an elite merchant had difficulties with the wine trade 
market in a particular year he may choose something else to trade so there might be a 
capital shift from one product to another or he might have given up trading entirely 
for a while because of an inefficient expenditure-profit balance.  
Another who focuses on the 1469-70 season is Richard Asshe who traded 
around 26 tuns of wine in this year. Like Thomas Avanne, Richard Asshe both used 
his own ships and was the master of these ships. This maximizes his responsibilities 
because he tried to carry the burden of investing the capital, shipowning expenditures 
and liabilities of a shipmaster which will be seen under piracy and contract chapters 
in detail with different aspects. However, apart from gathering all the possible risks 
in one single body, a successful shipment would mean a good amount of unshared 
cash for Richard Asshe most of the time.  
In Southampton, we have a very strong political-merchant domination in 
wine trade market but, unlike what was going on in the first half of the fifteenth 
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century, there were two merchant groups who undermined their dominance: citizens 
of London and “aliens” (foreigners). Alien merchants were always a threat to the 
Southampton elites and the reaction against them can be easily traced back in the 
first half of the century. In fact, the Southampton elites of the first half were hosting 
the foreign merchants to expand there area of influence at the beginning but when 
their dominance was threatened by foreign influence they started an economic 
alienation movement against foreigners to keep them out of their profit. 
It is best to start with the question of the Londoners in order to explain the 
competition for dominance. In fact, citizens of London did not compete with 
anybody in Southampton. They were only looking for good profit and they have vast 
amounts of capital to invest. This capital was much larger than the political-
merchants in Southampton could possibly cope with. For example, John Stokker 
unloaded approximately 50 tuns of wine on 7-8 June 1471 which was almost equal to 
the largest total of a Southampton bureaucratic elite‟s entire year transactions. 
Another citizen of London, John Fawn, brought approx. 73 tuns wine in three 
shipments which was beyond the imagination of any Southampton merchant, 
including those who had administrative positions. These amounts were not only for 
selling in Southampton naturally. Londoners could resell as big amounts of 
wholesale within Southampton or, most of the time, these could be sent to another 
town by using the land route to sell at there. For Londoners and most probably for 
every other merchant, sending their wine outside by land could be profitable since, 
when supply in Southampton was well-sustained and nearly unlimited, supply in 
inner parts of the country was less and their only gate to the sea was Southampton. 
Therefore, the merchant could easily sell the wine at a good price because of the high 
demand outside. Sending a product via land was not only profitable because of 
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higher demand there but also because of taxes. Southampton applied additional taxes 
when the wine changes hand within the boundaries of the city.  
However, although the Londoners could bring big quantities of wine and 
although they generally followed the most profitable ways of selling this wine, it 
should be remembered that they were playing at another team‟s stadium. All the 
citizens of London, who traded wines in the years of 1469-70 and 1470-71, 
transacted approximately 260 tuns of wine. Whereas the people who are indicated as 
burgesses traded 316 tuns, so our merchant-elites seem as they are still a dominant 
force. However, rough volumes cannot give the entire comparison and should be 
well analyzed by looking wine trade per merchant. 11 people were indicated as 
“citizen of London” and 20 names were shown as burgesses in the port records of 
two years. When Londoners had traded approximately 23 tuns of wine per merchant 
in these two years, our burgesses performance was approximately 16 tuns. Hence, 
Londoners exceeded the amount traded by Southampton merchant-elites in the 
second half of the fifteenth century. So, individual London merchants traded, on 
average, in bigger quantities than individual Southampton burgesses. 
As the second aspect of rivalry, there were aliens whose positions are 
changing throughout the fifteenth century. It is known from Platt‟s research that 
aliens were hosted well in the first half of the fifteenth century by the merchant-elites 
themselves, although the second half is slightly blurred. It is observable from the 
records that in the second half of the fifteenth century that neither the aliens nor the 
merchant-elites had the same performance as they had in the first half of the 
century.
58
 Aliens experienced a significant decline which, as in the case of burgesses, 
was parallel with the general decline of wine trade market. On the other hand, when 
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we compare the merchant elites of 1469-70 and 1470-71 with all other sporadic 
traders including aliens (and including abbots but excluding lords, seigneurs and 
knights), merchant-elites dominate the market. 135 sporadic trader completed 
approximately 1468 tuns of wine transaction whereas burgesses done 316. When 
these numbers are estimated per trader, merchant-elites had done 16 when sporadics 
could not exceed 11. However, these 11 tuns per trader is this much high only 
because of aliens and Londoners.  
In consequence, while administratively positioned merchants were 
observably dominant in the second half of the century, they did not have the same 
colossal difference with the sporadics as the merchant-elites of the first half had. In 
first half, Londoners performed better than them, aliens were closer and the rest of 
the sporadics were not that pale in comparison. Then the question that comes to mind 
is why did the performance of these political-merchants decrease if this dominance is 
related with bureaucratic position in the Southampton? 
In the second half of the century, privileged political-merchants are separated 
into two groups. The first group was actively trading administrators or political elite 
who can be seen in the sample port books and who also took action in transporting 
and taxing the product. For example, Thomas Avanne or Philip Tregas are the most 
well-known members of this group. The second group, on the other hand, cannot be 
observed in port books and cannot be traced by exchequer reports or brokage books. 
They were passive in the wine trade and they do deal with any burden related with 
wine trading but they consist of the uppermost point of the bureaucracy of 
Southampton. These names are not unfamiliar for someone who knows something 
about the fifteenth century Southampton administration or wine trade because these 
names were the entire group of political-merchants or merchant elites or “burgesses” 
 47 
 
of the first half of the century. Walter Fetplace, Peter James, William Nicole, Robert 
Eylward and John Pain did not want to give up their precious administrative offices 
and continued to rule Southampton with a confidence even higher than ever because, 
in 1445, King Henry VI‟s charter gave authority over Southampton to its local 
administrators by separating it from county administrators and then, in 1447, it 
becomes a county itself.
59
  Therefore, political elite of the first half of the century 
could not leave the kingdom they had built. As a matter of fact, the 1460 mayoral riot 
lies as a serious indicator that shows who are the leaders or at least who are the elites. 
The riot itself was to break the legacy of this small political group in mayoral office 
and related administrative positions but nothing changed substantially.  
When we get back to the wine trade and to conclude the entire position of 
political-merchants in Southampton, the dominance of these elite men was both 
observable and solid in the first half of fifteenth century while this dominance did not 
pass through to the second half in the same way. Even an elite group of 
administrators can still be indicated who also involved in trade, they were not 
controlling both entire borough and market. Based on the sample port books of 
Southampton, even the reign of political-merchants was temporary and was not 
inherited by the political elite of the second half. Even the burgesses of the second 
group took parts as serious players. However, a feature, which started with the first 
half elites, had been inherited by political elite in the second half and even later. At 
the beginning of the century, Henry IV stated that  
It was to be open to the mayor and bailiffs to take cognizance of „all pleas, real, 
personal and mixed, both those held by Assizes and certifications and of all 
others whatsoever concerning all tenements and tenures existing within the 
town and liberty, also of all manner of offences, debts, accounts, conventions, 
and all contracts whatsoever arising or done within the same town and liberty 
on both land and sea, namely, to be held before them in the Guildhall of the 
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town aforesaid, and there to be full determined by the same mayor and 
bailiffs‟60 
 
Thus, even the continuance of political-merchants‟ solid dominance did not last long, 
their effects on legal basis of the trade continues after Southampton became a county 
and this legal basis –from now on it will be termed as maritime contract law as a 
sub-branch of maritime law – was determined according to both their desires as 
bureaucrats and their needs –like investment security on the sea and on land- as 
maritime traders. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
BANDITS OF THE SEA 
 
 
 
2.1 Hostes Humani Generis 
 
The question related with wine piracy and how it affected the Southampton 
wine trade is a tough one to respond in every aspect because of the nature of piracy. 
For various reasons, to start with late medieval wine piracy of Southampton would 
be inefficient in terms of relating it with a legal framework. So it is better to begin 
with a definition of very early piracy to trace back the legal groundings of the 
piratical actions. Pirate comes from the Greek word peirates that passed to Latin as 
pirata whose roots come from Latin and Greek words mean “to attack” or “to 
attempt”.61 There are different references to early piratical attacks and pillages that 
are coming from the primary sources of Roman Empire that enable us to understand 
traditional the Roman narrative on piracy in a subjective manner that was shaped 
according to opinions and biases of the authors of these primary sources. Plutarch 
made references on piratical attempts of classical times in numerous ways. However, 
distinguishing piracy has been difficult since there was no strict definition of piracy 
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in a legal sense. Interpretations on piracy were all historical descriptions in these 
ancient documents rather than a judicially confirmed definition by any body of any 
state formation. Though, this difficulty of labeling some of the sea robbers as pirates 
should be seen as natural since pirata was used to describe an occupation, a way of 
life, a sporadic, individual attempt of sea robbery and an entire question of legal 
stance, all at the same time. Therefore, the standard interpretation of pirates as 
thieves at sea or the standard Hollywood image of “Black Beard” does not work well 
to explain every single aspect of pre-medieval and medieval pirates.  
As a first step, for the sake of a good starting point through the legal 
understanding of piracy and how these piratical attacks focused on wine trade in the 
late medieval times, a comprehension of how pre-medieval pirates were described is 
essential. For the piracy of Roman times, the assessments of Plutarch may be 
sufficiently descriptive by actually using the word pirate as  
The power of the pirates [peiratiki] had its seat in Cilicia …until they 
no longer attacked navigators only, but also laid waste islands and maritime 
cities. And presently men whose wealth gave them power, and whose lineage 
was illustrious, and those who laid claim to superior intelligence, began to 
embark on piratical craft and share their enterprises, feeling that the occupation 
brought them a certain reputation and distinction… Their flutes and stringed 
instruments and drinking bouts along every coast, their seizures of persons in 
high command, and their ransoming of captured cities, were a disgrace to the 
Roman supremacy.
62
 
 
Despite the usage of the word “pirate” in this piece and telling what the 
pirates were doing in the meantime, this does not show the reader what pirates are in 
today‟s understanding. In other words, pirates could not be defined via these words 
above. They could be pirates, privateers, a culture or racial background which had 
the general tendency of pillaging in order to sustain the basic needs (or wealth 
accumulation) or this can be a interpretive approach to general Cilician culture of the 
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meantime. Even the stance of piratical communities cannot be understood entirely 
from what Plutarch wrote, it might be analyzed via passing through the legal 
measures against pirates in Roman times, particularly with the Pompey‟s actions 
against piracy and entire piratical communities. The Roman Senate ratified this war 
against pirates and this, in fact, started to shape the legal framework of piratical 
communities. Following this, about five centuries later, Justinian‟s Digest writes, 
which was put in the context pretty well by Rubin, as “persons who have been 
captured by pirates or robbers remain [legally] free” 63  This statement is pretty 
important in terms of the beginning steps of what this chapters will be covering since 
it was the first instance of legal indication that shows what will judicially happen 
after the piratical attack. After this point, as Cicero summed up as hostes humani 
generis, stance of pirates in front of law started to clarify gradually.
64
 
Pirates were interpreted as international enemies because they did not only 
harm the political or military wellbeing of state but also the economy. It could be 
even said that their damage to the trade and financial well-being of both local and 
large scale territories was immense and sustainable. This damage is quite observable 
when one thinks the basic steps of trade, in our conditions wine trade. In medieval 
times, before the development of contract law, wine merchants were not secure and 
their shipment was not guaranteed legally, so most of the time, any loss, which was 
the result of piracy pillages, finalized as irreversible losses to merchants. This means 
that merchants could not get the income they expected as the first, micro perspective 
damage. Then, they could not supply the wine that was being demanded, hence, 
sources became scarcer which is the local scale damage. Following this, because of 
scarcer products, fewer sales and less consumption, state level taxes are naturally 
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expected to be lower. Even this basic example from wine trade can explain how 
piracy might affect finance in three different scales.  
Examples from ancient and medieval times give sufficient information to J. 
L. Anderson who properly allegorizes pirates as “a form of maritime 
macroparasites”65. In fact, this was an interpretation which could be applied to the 
piracies of all time zones and regardless of geography, because although Vikings 
existed as the greatest piratical culture of the middle ages, it cannot be counted in the 
traditional definition of piracy in medieval times. Vikings used their racial maritime 
culture to trace other ships and pillage all the products. Even, their economies and 
life styles were constructed on this behavior. However, interpretation of Viking 
standing is not the topic of this paper and should be argued in a broader context. On 
the other side, pirates chose to be parasitical although not their culture but their 
occupational position required to be.  
It should be noted that after the Roman Empire neither the European states 
nor the British Isles succeeded in developing a law of piracy. For sure, this 
backwardness of piracy law seems odd when piracy is thought as one of the most 
prominent economic problems for these geographies. However, even though these 
economic problems have always occurred, an efficient maritime law could only be 
seen after the twelfth century with the Amalfi Laws and Rolls of Oléron. The Amalfi 
Laws are generally related with logistics and settlement of disputes whereas, as their 
counterpart, the Rolls of Oléron are related to the responsibilities of the shipmaster 
and standing of crew before law. On the other hand, it should also be seen that there 
were no general laws in the meantime for maritime transactions. In other words, 
piratical attempt cases were judged according to ad hoc measures, which means there 
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was no “code” of maritime law or maritime economic law. Before the end of first 
quarter of fifteenth century, pirates were maritime mavericks that could not be 
controlled by anybody and their arrest was possible on a case-based decision. When 
a pirate had administrative position at the same time or if he was a part of some local 
elite, it was always a tough situation for court to decide the fate of the defendant.  
 
 
2.2 Men of the King 
 
 Before passing through piracy during the Hundred Years War, there is an 
important factor that has always been a controversial topic within the field of sea 
banditry, namely the distinction between piracy and privateering. Doubtless, it is 
difficult, or nearly impossible, to say which of them started first but it is for sure that 
pirates were used by nations frequently since the beginning of piracy. Privateers 
were not soldiers; at least they were not seen by rulers as soldiers but as half tool, 
half partner maritime mercenaries. They were tools because they were easy to use for 
the ruler‟s own benefit in return for cash or privileges like not being arrested. Even if 
officials of the king like bailiffs or knights arrested them, the privilege could still be 
used in the form of a quick release in return for helping the king with the pirate‟s 
ship in the time of warfare. At the same time, they were seen as partners because 
they were not doing business only to order. They were self-ordained and they are 
profit-focused. Their life style pushed them to be self-motivated, trespasser and 
ready to spontaneous captures. The king could cope with this only if he gave a 
further incentive (like money, privilege, etc.) to these pirates, who then became 
privateers by being semi-dependent on the king. Accounts of medieval piracy are 
generally complex and confusing because of these two terms since privateer is not a 
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word that was used widely in fifteenth-century accounts. The boundary between 
piracy and privateering is not a concrete, solid one in terms of usage. If there is a 
privateering attempt, which takes place in the accounts, it should be interpreted or 
speculated on by looking to the general flow of the narrative. 
A fairly good example of privateering could be seen through the 
correspondence between Admiral Robert de Morley and the king in 1346. It clearly 
shows the situation before the first quarter of fifteenth century in terms of being in 
need of services of privateers. In this petition, Admiral de Morley asked the king 
whether they can pardon William Hefoul, the pirate, in return for his future 
services.
66
 In a very similar manner, half a century before, pirates like Nicholas of 
Orford and Richard son of Eustach had not been imprisoned but released. Again, 
their release covered a strict condition of serving the king when he is sailing to 
Gascony by protecting him (or at least being a part of the fleet).
67
 In fifteenth 
century, nothing changed radically. Most fifteenth-century kings tried to take 
measures against pirates on different scales but one can hardly take measures against 
men who are secured by the king himself at the same time. Therefore, the formula 
for piracy in the English Channel was determined a long time earlier: pirates were 
privateers at the same time. They regularly captured merchant ships of all nations 
and, in return, the king‟s appointed knights or admirals were regularly arresting 
them. However, the consequence of arrest was not death or lifetime imprisonment or 
not even a long-term imprisonment. Because of the urgent need for sailors, captains 
and more vitally vessels, mavericks of the sea were seen as substitutes and additions 
for naval fleets.  
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When we continue with the fifteenth century, it is not difficult to see that this 
abovementioned position of pirates gave them a distinct confidence and their future 
flexible way of life in front of English legal structure. Pirates like John Hawley, 
Robert Bolt, John Corp, Edmund Arnold, Henry Pay of Poole and Richard Spicer of 
Portsmouth governing an irredentist, hostile and surprisingly privileged policy on the 
waters of the English Channel after seeing that kings by the end of first quarter of 
fifteenth century had no choice other than using them. 
68
 
Another problem with the kings‟ maritime mercenaries was that they were 
not loyal, at least not all of them. The Hundred Years War was a very suitable 
condition to be a man of both sides or to change sides to have better benefits, so 
pirates and privateers of the fifteenth century tended to “change [their] allegiance”.69 
Despite their blurred loyalty, the English government continued to utilize their 
services until Henry V reduced this dependency on pirates or privateers appreciably. 
However, men of the king returned to their special position right after his term.  
Even in the reign of Henry V, pirates and would-be- pirates were involved in 
the maritime affairs of the English government. In the Hundred Years War, during 
the engagements between England and France, pirates contributed to the defense of 
Southampton and the protection of merchant ships between the two states. What was 
special in Henry‟s reign is most of the non-naval contributors to maritime defense 
were would-be-pirates rather than present ones. For example, in 1418-9, one of the 
most effective maritime defenders of the king was Richard Spicer, who was a 
potential pirate, but at the same time an efficient coast guard.
70
 Henry V succeeded in 
keeping them passive and used them as tools for homeland protection despite their 
potential to be harmful. 
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The two aspects of fifteenth-century pirates were coincidentally interpreted 
best by Nietzsche, effectively explaining the men of the king: “Merchant and pirate 
were for a long period one and the same person”71. The occupations of merchant, 
pirate, privateer and naval officer were not clear cut but obscure and interchangeable.  
 
 
2.3 Piracy in the Fifteenth Century 
 
 Before giving a case-by-case analysis of Southampton wine piracy, it will be 
beneficial to examine the general position of piracy in England by constructing a 
political-economic narrative for this. The first character was John Hawley(s) whose 
effects on maritime trade started in the late fourteenth century. He interfered with 
Flemish, Spanish and especially French trade with England. He, his son and his 
grandson were not specifically focused on the wine trade or any other particular 
product because the most important thing was stealing a product which could be 
resold easily. It is stated that “For theft to be profitable, „stolen‟ goods must have a 
market. Where the market is in the control of a „government‟, a person or body to 
whom is conceded the legal power to change title to property, and a „taking‟ is 
authorized by the proprietor of that market, it is difficult to conceive of „stealing‟ as 
distinct from „lawful capture‟ or „ taxation‟.” 72 While this goes much to the 
theoretical, legal aspect of piracy rather than its practicality, the quotation can be 
interpreted that as long as a pirate has a market for the product, the right to acquire 
the product and the technique for doing so did not matter.  
This was the situation before Henry V who did his best to prevent piracy. 
Before Henry V, during the reign of his father there were serious attempts to stop 
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piracy but because of one serious reason they were never realized. This difficulty that 
was experienced in the reign of Henry IV can hardly be put better than Jill Eddison 
who puts it:  
…The greatest, and continuous, challenge which Henry faced was on his 
southern flank, where renewed and increasing violence was seriously 
threatening the trade which was vital to his interests. As ever, a large 
proportion of the English national income came from taxes on imports and 
exports, especially on wine and wool, which were essential to maintain both 
economic and social stability at home. This was threatened by political 
repercussions of the activities of English pirates interfering with the ships of 
[England‟s trade partners]… If diplomatic relations with those countries 
became soured by the depredations of those English pirates, southern galleys 
could easily bypass Southampton…73 
 
To interpret what Jill Eddison has said, Henry IV had to solve the problem of 
piracy on English waters in order to sustain England‟s political, social and especially 
economic well-being. However, he could not because he had little choice other than 
maintaining these pirates as privateers.
74
 With all the inner and international 
hostilities of the time, he had to secure the English coasts and sustain his 
southernmost trade through Southampton and elsewhere. On the other hand, this 
required an immense amount of naval power which England did only relatively have 
at the time. In place of this requisite naval force, Henry IV gathered privateers as 
hired mercenaries on sea both to protect coasts and to guarantee the safe passage of 
the wine and wool trade. To put it another way, in the reign of Henry IV, pirates 
were both the police force and symbols of maritime banditry at the same time, which 
tells us so much about the deadlock in maritime affairs during the reign of Henry IV.  
In fact, the situation of pirates did not consist of two opposite identities, but at 
the same time being more and more maverick in maritime affairs. Henry IV made the 
mistake of sharing his authority with the pirates in maritime affairs, but the pirates 
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did not want to be tied to the king but rather to manage the entire trade. This 
quenchless point of view become a reality in later terms of Henry IV and 
privateering became unmanageable that symbiotically placed within military and 
economic units of England. 
This corruption and unwieldiness lasted until the reign of Henry V. Henry 
realized the actual effects of piracy as an intense and increasing one. He inherited a 
very difficult condition of maritime affairs from his father and the position of pirates 
was always blurred: they could be mercenaries or they could be a burden. Henry V 
saw them all as a burden and the logic behind this is understandable. Although some 
of the pirates were usable by extending them privileges and money, Henry had 
sufficient financial demands to cope with in his reign. The Hundred Years War was 
continuing and Henry had done quite a good job of obtaining the support of nobility 
after a couple of notable victories. But war expenditures had always been more than 
expected and this was not different in the Hundred Years War. Henry V did not have 
a flexible budget that could freely sustain money to hire pirates as mercenaries. 
Another reason for Henry to see pirates as solely trouble was the fact that they were 
not trustworthy and they never would be. They could change sides, their affiliations 
were tied to money or a saleable commodity, and they generally acted like children 
of maritime trade whose desires never end. So the decision was made to try to 
prevent piracy totally by taking overall political measures.  
 The first legal-political action of Henry V was the Statute of Truce in 1414. 
This statute stated that any piratical actions, which were against the law and against 
the well being of the trade between nations, would result in the death penalty. Before 
the reign of Henry V, most penalties against piratical actions took the form of 
imprisonment. This imprisonment was a semi-permanent one, because if a particular 
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pirate had the duty of maritime mercenary at the same time, in other words, if the 
pirate was also a privateer, then the king could release him to make him pay his debt 
with good service, as can be seen in the examples of William Hefoul and Nicholas of 
Orford. The Statute, in fact, worked positively and enabled a peaceful, undisturbed 
international trade for a while. From any record or narrative, it can be seen that there 
were a few court petitions concerning piratical attempts.
75
 With the death of Henry 
V, pirates emerged again to go on from where they had left off with the Statute of 
Truce and the legal stance of Henry V, because there was lack of a political and legal 
order against sea banditry of all kinds after Henry‟s reign.  
Figure 1 
 
 
By looking to the records of the Patent Rolls (of different periods), a clearer 
analysis of the situation of fifteenth-century piracy can be reached. Graph 1 shows 
the number of piracy cases recorded in the Patent Rolls for various periods during the 
fifteenth century. At the beginning of the century, piratical attempts were frequent 
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and were not countered by legal measures yet. When we come to the reign of Henry 
V, a serious decline can be observed: from 18 piracy records in total, it decreased to 
12 in 1413-16 and decreased even more in the second half as 8. A few years after 
Henry V‟s reign, his legal control efforts could still be seen as effective because 
there was only a slight increase in the total number of piracies, to 10. However, this 
was the starting point of rise in number of piracies and after two or three decades, his 
measures had lost their practicality and efficiency, which could be seen from the 
numeric data. It rose to 28 between 1452-1461 and then peaked in 1467-77 with 29 
piratical attempts. So it could be seen from the Patent Rolls that total number of 
piratical attacks, like the records of these terms and secondary literature shows, 
started as a prominent threat against trade at the beginning of the century, followed 
by a sharp decrease by courtesy of Henry V and finally rose up to a number which 
means a fluctuating but solid existence of fifteenth-century piracy in English 
Channel.  
Figure 2 
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When the information of the number of wine piracy attempts and piratical 
attacks in Southampton are obtained, it gives a more dramatic change to us in order 
to see what was the effect of Henry V‟s reign and with what kind of a scale piracy 
reemerged after his reign. Whereas wine piracy could not be seen at all in the first 
volume of the patent rolls of Henry V‟s reign, it could be seen in a very small 
number in the second volume. On the other hand, following his reign, there was a 
slight increase which brought the numbers of wine piracy to pre-Henry V level. After 
a few decades, wine piracy doubled the early fifteenth century records and the 1430s 
(In the graph above, wine piracy in the Henry VI and Edward IV‟s reigns is four 
times greater than Henry IV‟s or earlier parts of Henry VI reign. However, the last 
data of Henry VI and Edward IV‟s reigns covered about ten years, whereas Henry 
IV‟s patent rolls covered only four and a half years. So it would be better to see this 
increase as a double). By looking to data on both of the tables above, it could be 
easily seen that the endeavor of Henry V worked only temporarily. Piracy stood as 
the dominant threat on the seas for the wine trade in the fifteenth century and by 
looking to the records, it could also mentioned that this threat did not affect only the 
English administration but also of that France, Brittany, Castile and the Italian states. 
By the middle of fifteenth century, the only option to avoid piracy was wine fleets 
for wine merchants; on the other hand, the fear of piratical attempts did not decrease 
until the end of the century.  
 
2.4 The Records 
 
 In the fifteenth century, throughout England, records contain great numbers 
of piratical attacks despite of different interventions of the kings of England against 
piracy. For example, on 5 May 1403, there is a record of Norman piracy. It seems 
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that the ship named “la Katherina”, which was owned by Andrew Dymanges, John 
Englisshe and Petraus, who is a merchant of Lisbon, was captured by Norman 
pirates. However, since this chapter also argues the position of piracy before the law, 
unless the record does not use the word pirate, it might only be a speculative 
interpretation to name them as pirates. The record uses the phrase as “captured by 
Normans” 76 without indicating their occupation. Hence, two options, namely piracy 
or privateering, could be thought. This ship was carrying 74 tuns of wine along with 
other merchandise to bring to England until the unnamed Normans captured it. By 
forces from Greenwich, Shrewsbury and Southampton, these Normans were duly 
captured and taken to Southampton. It is not indicated what happened after the trial 
of these pirates or privateers but it is known that the normal procedure in the 
fifteenth century was the return of the aforesaid merchandise to the owners and the 
arrest of these pirates. This penalty could also be a death penalty depending on 
whose reign it was but since it was the reign of Henry IV, imprisonment could be 
assumed to be the final decision.  
In another record of same year 18 July, king ordained one of his men to 
investigate an unlawful capture of the ship Saint Marie.
77
 The portuguese merchant 
Laurence de Seosa owned this Portuguese ship and its master was Dominic 
Gunsaldus. The ship‟s cargo was 42 tuns of Gascon wine to be taken them to London 
from Southampton but it was stopped and captured by four balingers of English 
people. Apparently, according to the French authorities, Roderick Aves was seen as 
responsible for this capture along with his crew and was duly imprisoned. Henry IV, 
on the other hand, regarded this imprisonment as contrary to the treaty between 
England and France and demanded restitution. Most probably, the treaty in question 
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was the Truce of Leulinghem which was signed in 1389. It had resulted in a short 
break in the Hundred Years War and in the meantime, the king of England had saved 
some time to cope with domestic affairs. Eventually in September 1403, this truce 
came to an end and hostilities between two countries resumed.
78
 This information 
gives us the chance to tie the record of Southampton wine piracy and the end of the 
truce, only by looking at the timing and indication of “contrary to the form of the 
treaty between the king and French”. This disagreement over the treaty was caused 
by a piratical attempt that happened on 18 July, whereas the end of truce was in 
September. The assumption of the events of 18 July as one of the catalysts that 
brought the short period of truce to an end, would not be overly creative but making 
an inductive estimation.  
As a second interpretation of the piratical attack that was recorded on 18 July 
1403, the position of Roderick Aves seems slightly blurred. Considering the pirates 
of Hawley family, it should be always kept in mind that pirates might have different 
kinds of relationship with the king or more generally with the administration. As the 
English authorities investigated the fate of Roderick Aves and his men and 
demanded restitution, he may have been more than a regular pirate, perhaps a 
privateer. Unfortunately, we have no documents to support this assumption. Even for 
pirates from the Hawley family, there are a few documents that help estimate their 
position as privateers. Therefore, along with avoiding any certain conclusions, it 
should be seen that some certain pirates had more than one identity as pirates, 
privateers, mercenaries for hire or even saboteurs of enemy trade. 
Piracy was so intense and frequent that in the first decade of the fifteenth 
century, there might be seen various kinds of piratical attempts. Although most of 
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these records involved wine, non-wine captures could be seen as well. Because of 
this repetition, since these were inflicting a serious damage to trade, on 21 July, just 
three days after the abovementioned piratical attempt, the government decided to 
declare a general commission. This commission demanded the arrest of “all banished 
persons, sea-robbers and evildoers”79 with reference to the Truce of Leulinghem. 
This general decree can show how widespread these piratical attempts were and how 
alarmed the government had become because of these chaotic circumstances on sea. 
Naturally, the efforts of Henry V did not mean that there were no piracy at all 
during his reign. There were pirates and privateers who attacked the ships of both 
sides during the Hundred Years War. After all, one cannot assume the threat of many 
centuries would disappear at once just with the good performance of one single 
monarch, so expecting a complete elimination does not seem very rational. In a state 
of war, pirates emerge faster than clover in shade. This chaotic situation can be seen 
as their habit, because they are the masters of exploiting weaknesses. Furthermore, 
war was, in the meantime, such a condition that there was very little law in it and if 
there has always been one general requirement to gather pirates in one point, it is 
“lawlessness [as] a requisite of piracy”80 Hence, in Henry V‟s reign, as well, pirates 
could be seen in the records, but these records are much rarer than before and after 
Henry V, perhaps thanks to the king‟s policies.  
Although Henry V made substantial efforts to eliminate the effects of piracy, 
nothing really changed in the long-term. Neither legal nor practical measures against 
piracy allowed maritime affairs to evolve into a perpetually secure space. As 
explained above, the king and his privateer allies, the maritime mavericks, kept the 
maritime trade in a cooperative manner. With Henry V, privateer influence on 
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maritime trade decreased, especially in Southampton, and their political position was 
reduced to the level of sea banditry again. Unfortunately, this consolidation in the 
political immune system of England was limited to the reign of Henry V and, 
although pirates or privateers failed to achieve legitimization as much as they did in 
Henry IV‟s period, their effects on maritime trade remained prominent throughout 
the fifteenth century.  
In a record from Henry V‟s reign, after his victory at Agincourt, a wine fleet 
is mentioned carrying an immense amount of wine and by a ship called Christopher 
of Hull.
81
 Suitable to the logic of wine fleets, their duty was to stick together in front 
of any dangerous situation regardless of the kind or size of the threat. As long as 
everybody obeyed this one single rule, they could survive. However, all of the other 
ships fled after they saw attacking pirates and Christopher stayed alone. It is stated 
that the owner of Christopher petitioned the others to pay for his loss for not 
fulfilling what they needed to do.  
Thus, there was piracy and piratical attempts, provably through primary 
sources, even when Henry V was on the throne, but the frequency of the records of 
piratical attacks reflects the fact that a severe decline of piracy had been achieved by 
Henry V, despite the existence of different kinds of exceptions as in this wine fleet 
case. Another thing that should be interpreted by looking to the situation of the 
Christopher of Hull is that even in Henry V‟s reign, there was no legal infrastructure 
to sustain any automatic decision making in events like this particular one. The 
owner of the Christopher had to send a petition and explicitly demand the creation of 
a law for this single case rather than the application or implementation of existing 
laws. This gap has always been there and lies as a problem that makes legal and 
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political tools cumbersome but the position of contract law will be explained in detail 
in the next chapter to tie together the wine trade, piracy and how they affected legal 
entity in Southampton. 
To go on with the records of later terms in order to see how they return to the 
pre-Henry V level after his reign, on the day of 8 April 1435, another record that is 
generally based on Southampton wines took its place in books. Record says that 
wines that were coming to Southampton by a few ships (it is not indicated that these 
wines were whether for the consumption of Southampton or coming for the 
distribution via the routes of Southampton). These ships were lost around the coast of 
Southampton and the rest of the record is related with what to do with the wines that 
were found later on and who were the owners to give them back. However, there is 
an interesting phrase within the record associated with how these ships got lost. The 
text states “ships were lost through the violence of the sea”.82 Naturally, this does not 
necessarily make this case a piratical case. This could only be an interpretation to 
define weather situations and the only intention by saying violence of the sea might 
be defining a storm or a changing stream. On the other hand, rest of the record 
continues as “part [of wine] thereof has been restored to merchants of Bruges and 
Dam” and it gives the idea that this commission was to ordain people in order to find 
or rescue some of the wines to return those to their owners. As it is stated previously, 
after the reign of king Henry V, piracy did not remain at the low levels of second half 
of first quarter of fifteenth century. Especially wine piracy showed a rising trend so, 
because of the general frequency of piratical attacks, this record has the flavor of sea-
robbery and rescue mission in order to protect the rights of international merchants 
and domestic consumers.  
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Another thing that should be understood from this record is that the owners of 
these wines could prove their ownership of the merchandise by going to the court or 
pledging directly to the men of the king in different bureaucratic levels. It is an 
important detail to be focused on because when the issue comes to the maritime 
contract law of late medieval Southampton, it will be important to spot the rights of 
proprietors of commodities and how they tried to split their risks up for the sake of 
protecting themselves from piracy.  
Following this record, on 18 November of same year, another commission 
comes that lies as the continuation of the one above. This time, the king ordained his 
men to sell these wines that continued to be unclaimed by the merchants of Flanders 
by getting permission from the lords in whose territory these wines cast ashore.
83
 As 
it can be seen, in piratical threats or others that make the merchants lose their capital 
are not tied to one solid, existing law, but these cases are issued to ad hoc, case-by-
case decisions of the administration. Even though there was a merchant law in the 
implementation of the trade and there was a strong precedence that people get used 
to do in a particular way, maritime issues were flexible and because of this constant 
state of flux, both administration and merchants have to cope with bureaucratic 
clumsiness in smallest situations both in Southampton and generally in England.  
Despite the variation of piratical cases related with both wine and 
Southampton, the most concrete case was experienced in 8 September 1435. This 
time the recorder used the word “robbery” for the entire occasion.84 A carrack was 
loaded to convey goods from Southampton to Genoa. Genoese merchants who were 
living in London owned this unnamed Genoese vessel. At this moment, a few details 
should be noted: in the trade between Southampton and Genoa, a broad range of 
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products being transacted, including wine. As can be seen in alien book parts of 
different port records, carracks were loaded much more than any other denizen ship 
both because of the loading capacity and because these international merchants 
wanted to send as much as possible in each single shipment to save time and money 
(Shipment fee, anchorage fee and other possible local taxes were implemented per 
shipment).
85
 Furthermore, again according to port records, it is evident that both 
merchants from London and international merchants were richer than domestic 
sporadic traders
86
. So, they would not avoid from investing capital, which they 
already had, to earn more. By considering these facts, one can assume this carrack 
was a heavily loaded one. The record of 8 September 1435 gives other rare details: 
for example, it states that because of heavy weather conditions, this carrack lost its 
way and was dragged along the waves to the Plymouth coast, which is close to 
Southampton and was known to be the place of robbery. Unfortunately, this 
commission did not mention the nationalities of these pirates but at least we can 
assume that the pirates should be populated in a large vessel or should be acting as 
team that consists of more than one ship to rob the carrack since even these were 
only merchant carracks, their endurance and defense mechanisms were usually 
proportional with their loads.  
To make an assessment for the entire century, records from second half of 
fifteenth century should also be scrutinized. Much later in the century, in 1469, a 
significantly salient record could be easily spotted which enlightens the situation of 
the period. In this record, an incredible range of piratical attacks were named and 
commissions or appointments related with these attacks were indicated. The date 27 
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July 1469 is recorded but, within the record, different dates of the abovementioned 
attacks were given as well. As the first instance a vessel le Barbara of Fowy owned 
by various merchants of Brittany was captured by pirates along with its merchandise. 
87
 It was mentioned separately that this capture was contrary to the treaty between 
Brittany and England. A ship called la Kateryne of Crauzon was captured near Belle 
Isle with 37 tuns of wines and other merchandise on the day of 17 May whereas a 
couple days later other vessels named Nostre Dame de Seynt Michell and Saint 
Julian de Benaudet were captured that were carrying 23 and 27 tuns of wines 
respectively. In another section of the same record, Spanish ships were captured, 
again near Belle Isle, with a broad range of products on board including 23 tuns of 
wine, around February. As the most serious victim, “a ship of Ivo Guillo laden with 
52 tuns of wine of Ivo Guillo, a carvel laden with 63 tuns of wine of Ivo Guillo” was 
captured along with other Spanish ships. In addition, tuns of Gascon wines had been 
captured, 44 tuns of wine of John Guillebot and James Locabellok and lots of other 
goods such as linen, iron and coins of different currencies were added to the loss list 
of these merchants in the record.  
Related with this vital record, the first thing to be said is the popularity of 
wine. This record can be seen as a micro sample of overall piratical attacks and the 
frequency of wine trade, relative to other products, could easily be observed. In most 
of the Patent Rolls records, more than half of piratical cases involve wine. In this 
record, this percentage is much greater than this. Moreover, these piratical attacks are 
samples that are taken from the events of one single year (or even a shorter time 
period) in a single record. When it is considered that there are various piratical 
records in one year, the frequency of piracies should be multiplied. Another thing to 
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show attention is the nationality of the merchants. Pirates of the second half of 
fifteenth century did not aim to cut a single trade route that was used by a particular 
nationality, or they did not target one single product (even they have some favored 
merchandises) but they had the tendency to capture as much as valuable and easy-to-
sell cargo as possible in a single strike. Because alien merchants tended to carry and 
sell more, the potential targets selected were alien merchants and carracks. 
In 1474, another distinctive record appears that shows the consequences of a 
long-distance piratical attack between England and Castile.
88
 This time the case is 
related with one single piratical attempt, insofar as it concerned one single merchant, 
namely Peter Neto from Castile. He was trading with the English ports of Bristol, 
Sandwich and Southampton and at a time he came to the English coasts, pirates of 
Fowey captured his ship. This record is an indication of the grant to compensate 
Neto‟s losses according to the treaty between England and Castile.  
There are three important factors, which distinguish this particular record 
from other attempts of piracy or privateering, that are to be examined in depth. First 
of all, apparently, there was a treaty between England and Castile that indicates 
counter measures against piratical attacks. In the meantime, as it was mentioned 
previously, there were no legal measures against piracy at a trade law level. On the 
other hand, this was a time of fragile relations between nations, so, in order to sustain 
the balance and the peace between these nations, these two countries established a tie 
in the form of treaty to estimate what to do after a piratical attempt between the 
members of these nations. Secondly, this record was written as “despoiled on the 
high seas by certain pirates of Fowey [in Cornwall] ” by using the word pirate and by 
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mentioning where they are from.
89
 This terminology is rare at the time because sea 
bandits, evildoers and variations of these were widely used, but piracy as a term was 
not. The terminology shows how piratical attempts infused maritime affairs of the 
fifteenth century and put a different terminology in the literature. From these times 
onwards, pirata will be used more often to indicate a very specific occupation. 
Thirdly and lastly, an unnamed ship was mentioned as “with a ship laden with wines, 
goods and other merchandise”. Wines are identified separately whether because most 
of the goods in the vessel were wines or because wines are the most precious ones 
that were worth naming. In both cases, this makes the case a wine piracy case, but 
naturally, the question of whether the pirates knew about the merchandise of ship and 
attacked with its nature in mind, cannot be answered due to lack of sources.  
Pirates of Fowey became a noteworthy trouble following this event. On 28 
November 1474, king of England proved this by forming an entire commission 
targeting their illegal actions. This commission was against “all masters, mariners 
and pirates, possessors and victuallers of any ships and vessels of the towns and ports 
of Fowey, Bodennek and Polruen, as they have committed great depredations on 
goods and merchandise…”90 and does not only give us the chance to see where 
piratical attacks were coming from, but also, helps us see the desperate situation of 
state organs in coping with piracy by looking to the words of “great depredations”. 
According to findings that are shown in this chapter, piracy did not start in 
fifteenth century for sure, but both piracy and privateering were on the rise during 
fifteenth century despite the efforts of Henry V to reduce it. Like every 
symbiotic/parasitic phenomenon, it remains in a dark place which English political-
legal mechanisms could not reach by the end of first quarter and then return to the 
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life with the first weakness (which is the end of Henry V‟s reign in this case) it can 
use for its growth. The abovementioned records of Southampton wine piracy (or 
generally wine piracy) are shown in order to illustrate both position of piracy and the 
chart of its intensity because it is important to understand how piracy was positioned 
in Hundred Years War in southernmost England to see incessant corroding effect, 
rather than a harsh, solid and observable damage like the war itself . Administrative 
sphere of England could not find a permanent solution for piracy but how legal 
procedure evolved contract law to protect the wine merchants‟ investment remains 
another distinct issue to focus on.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
COMMERCIAL MARITIME LAW 
 
 
 
After explaining the late medieval wine trade in the port of Southampton and 
the existing situation of piracy in the English Channel in the same period, their 
relation to the maritime contract law can be constructed. According to the simple 
logic of this thesis, like the link between the increasing popularity of the wine trade 
and the increasing frequency of piracy, there might be a link between the late 
medieval piratical attempts and the development in contractual measures. To 
examine this link and show whether this link can be demonstrable or not, the 
situation of the late medieval contracts and their regular processes will be the first 
step. Following this, a primary source analysis will be made to seek any indication of 
the effect of piratical attempts on contractual measures within the maritime codes of 
England and Southampton. Finally, clashing jurisdictions of different legal branches 
will be examined because whereas piratical cases were under the jurisdiction of 
admiralty law, the law of contracts was under the jurisdiction of common law or 
merchant law. This divergence of legal branches affected the link of interrelatedness 
between these two phenomena (contract law and piracy).  
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3.1 Late Medieval Contracts 
 
As one of the most widespread hands of trade merchandise, wine was a vital 
element of the late medieval English economy with the income that came from both 
taxes from its retail sale within the country and its international trade taxes. 
However, wine was as appealing to pirates as it was for the state administration. It 
was easy to sell, demand never ended for it, and it was relatively easy to capture 
compared with well-guarded vessels that were carrying more valuable goods like 
precious metals. Thus, on the coasts of Southampton and generally on the waters of 
the English Channel, piratical attempts went on incessantly and with a gradual 
increase from the end of Henry V‟s reign. It meant that there was an increasing risk 
of and fear of piracy that pushed people to take any measure they could. Purpose of 
this final chapter is to establish a link between the previous chapters and medieval 
maritime contract law of Southampton in order to see whether piracy unintentionally 
helped develop this judicial branch or not. By looking the general sources of legal 
aspect of maritime trade and local Southampton sources related with it, we can hope 
to determine whether piracy can be shown as one of the effects or might be 
considered as one of the factors. 
The legal framework of medieval English towns or more generally of 
England as a whole was not clear-cut. It was very open to interpretation because 
there is a limited amount of written sources left from that period.
91
 There were 
different kinds of legal constructions and judicial branches for all areas in which law 
can be implemented. Royal courts and local courts acted in different spheres and 
could be both completely independent and interdependent according to the nature of 
a case or plea. Naturally, this does not mean that medieval English law was to be 
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interpreted as vague in all its aspects, but it should be still seen that it consisted of 
singular particles in micro-perspective which were tied to one another when we look 
to the general picture. For example, a case might be under the jurisdiction of a local 
court related with the area of contract law; however, from a general point of view, 
contract law was under merchant law or common law, and the position that 
determines this merchant or common law was royal authorities rather than the local 
authorities.
92
 Thus, one should imagine a flow diagram of English legal structure as 
both interrelated and multi-layered.  
Before considering contract law and what features it had in late medieval 
Southampton and generally in England, the term contract should be understood. In 
the modern sense, the word contract refers to a written agreement that protects the 
right of signatories before the law against the other parties and against certain 
predetermined kinds of external damages. To put it another way, a contract is a tool 
to legitimize what one is going to do and sets out how it will be so, legally. However, 
contract could not be defined in the same way in medieval times.  
First of all, it may not be written, but could be oral (like a promise or an oath) 
as well. In fact, it was generally oral until the fourteenth century, because of which it 
was no more than a mutual oath.
93
 Thus, the role of “consent” takes a substantial 
place in medieval contractual actions. People transacted with each other if they had a 
certain amount of trust in one another and this was a much stricter determinant of 
trade than it is today when people live under the secure roof of a modernized legal 
system. Secondly, medieval contracts did not cover a standard number of simple 
information and articles in it. For example, in contracts related with maritime trade, 
there were some charter-parties that covered only the names of merchants, ships, 
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what will be carried and what are the conditions, whereas there were others which 
covered every single detail even information like a full crew list, due dates and route. 
So, standardization was not a characteristic of late medieval contracts.  
Lastly, the medieval contract had a vague identity about its enforcements in 
case of breaching it. It was hard to say which court will be interested in these 
particular cases, such as maritime transactions, because, for instance, in the case of a 
plea to inform the court about the loss caused by a piratical attack, it would include 
more than one layer and one legal discipline. A plea like this addressed at least 
merchant law and admiralty law (as the responsible legal branch for maritime affairs 
in England), which were judged by different courts and created a clash of judicial 
powers. When the possible jurisdictional dispute of a local court and royal court was 
added to this formula, the judicial process related with breach of any contract could 
come to a deadlock and because of this, maritime trade and contracts that includes 
anti-piratical measures and the authority of judgment of them changed hands in 
medieval history more than one time. This clash of jurisdictions will be seen below 
in detail since it was more harmful for the aim of constructing a relation between 
piracy and commercial law. 
Contract law, as a single body of law, was not new at all. As it can be briefly 
summarized, its origins came from ancient Roman law as well as most of the legal 
framework of Europe. The Roman Empire had reached wide borders throughout the 
Europe, Africa and even the Middle East. Even though the Empire had continuously 
changing modes and efficiencies of production and temporary problems with 
liquidity of money, they structured a good organization on long-distance trade for the 
time. Insomuch that, some of the towns were completely dependent to long-distance 
luxury trade rather than agrarian production, which was the mainstay for the most. 
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Although trade was widely practiced, the Romans did not come up with the idea of a 
contract law immediately. Yet, it was in the form of structured promises that were 
given beforehand.  
This unstructured body of contract law lasted approximately until the Italians 
established commenda contracts during the Renaissance.
94
 This contractual 
framework consists of three different contract types, which in fact, were 
implemented in Roman times, the Middle Ages and post renaissance times in a 
gradually increasing manner.
95
 The Commenda is the first type, which generally 
means that the labor and capital for a particular transaction were added by different 
bodies.
96
 In other words, when one merchant was investing capital but not 
contributing to the labor, the shipmaster functions only as the labor branch of this 
transaction rather than adding any money. This could be seen as the most basic and 
regular type of contract and was generally used when the labor did not have anything 
to contribute and would take part only as the functioning side in this specific 
transaction.  
On the other hand, one different type of contract, the collegantia, was 
designed to satisfy another need in possible forms of transaction. This contract was 
used when there was more than one investor for a particular transaction and if the 
one responsible for the labor branch contributed to the capital as well. This was 
common and was quite beneficial, especially for shipmasters since they generally 
wanted to utilize what was to be sold at the destination point as a shareholder along 
with the payment they would be taking (in advance or after accomplishment) as labor 
force that carried the merchandises that will be benefited from. When we examine 
the port books of Southampton, it is not hard to understand how frequent this type of 
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contract was. In the port books from the first quarter, middle and late fifteenth 
century, there were so many merchants who acted as the master of a ship as well 
which means that these shipmasters were joining or contributing to the entire 
investment in order to benefit from the total profit as well from his normal payment 
as a shipmaster. This situation can be clearly observed through the port books of 
Southampton when the names of merchant and shipmaster are same. This lies as a 
strong indication of collegantia contract that also shows the general contractual 
tendency of the period, of course along with the most regular type, commenda.  
As the last branch, a rarer type of contract should be mentioned in order to 
complete the three-branched contractual system that was used for a very long time 
with different names and geographical nuances. The Compagna contract was 
designed to leave no sleeping partners in a transaction.
97
 All the investors should 
contribute to the labor and all members of labor should be shareholders at the same 
time. It was not a frequently implemented system, but more likely designed as an 
ideal one. When all of the investors of capital contributed to the labor, the job to be 
done would be easier and faster, whereas, in the case of contribution of labor to 
capital, the transaction became more affordable for all of the merchants and the risk 
became smaller. Hence this aspect of compagna contracts will bring up the issue of 
risk management in late medieval trade. 
Although not the reason for existence of contracts, if there was one single 
problem that medieval merchants had always to deal with, it was the substantial 
amount of risk in a single transaction.  Thus, the first thing to explain is what were 
the possible risks in the fifteenth century wine trade of Southampton. In fact, very 
few of these risks were unique to Southampton. These were general risks that 
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inflicted an overall damage to the economy of England because wine was one of the 
most important commodities in late medieval England and was a very vital part of 
the overall English economy. The first and most common risk was the weather. Even 
during clement periods for trade and suitable times for ships to sail on international 
waters, weather was not always predictable. Tides could be higher than expected and 
storms or high winds were not uncommon. These kinds of weather conditions might 
cause light losses of commodities with which the ship was laden, but could also 
cause very serious damage like the loss of the entire ship with all its goods.  
Another risk was the breaking of a verbal agreement. One of the sides of this 
agreement, for example the seller of the merchandise, could retract from his promise 
or could easily demand more for the same amount of product than he previously did. 
Or in another similar form, the seller might give products with defects in different 
scales which would eventually cause loss for the buyer since this product was 
generally bought wholesale from another country to England in order to sell these 
products retail for bigger profits. Defective products would affect both the demand 
and possible maximum price for these products negatively, so fraudulent behavior of 
one of the sides of an agreement (most probably verbal) was a great risk to avoid. 
Finally, piracy was always a risk, especially in long distance, international 
trade. As demonstrated above, pirates aimed to attack any trade in the Channel that 
could be financially beneficial for them and one of their most favored products was 
wine because it was easy to sell. Southampton took its place at the records of piracy 
in various times and Southampton waters became one of the pirates‟ favorite places 
to lie in an ambush. In addition, while the other risks of transactions could be limited 
and rare in records, piracy was both frequent and caused a loss which can be summed 
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up as everything (including merchandise, ship and crew).
98
 Therefore, at least for the 
late medieval Southampton wine trade, piratical attempts were the most dangerous, 
most fearful, but at the same time one of the most common risks to be protected 
against with any measure that could be taken, including legal ones. 
For Southampton, it was not radically different from what happened 
elsewhere in England because, for a long time, it was completely depended on the 
English legal structure with the identity of an English town rather than a separate 
county. After it became a county in 1446, it gathered more legal authority into the 
hands of local courts than previously.
99
 Verbal-oral contracts started to be dealt with 
by local courts in Southampton and it started to construct its own legal identity along 
with general developments in the legal sphere in England. In order to comprehend 
the position of Southampton in maritime contract law and what was the difference or 
particularity of this area, the general maritime records of England, maritime law 
“codes” like the ones that are included by Black Book of Admiralty and specifically 
the Southampton books and records should be scrutinized. Only such a broad scale 
search can enable one to see whether wine, piracy and contract law could be tied 
together with a triangular link in late medieval Southampton. 
 
3.2 Maritime Codes 
 
 In the first instance, the Rolls of Oléron can be stated as one of the oldest 
documents for maritime affairs which aimed to bring a certain amount of order to 
maritime trade and organization.
100
 Even though it was seen as the backbone of 
maritime and admiralty law in England for a long period, it is hard to see this as a 
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maritime law code in today‟s terms. But, one can hardly be doubtful that this 
document was the starting point for a period seeking maritime law, and because of 
this, later documents were more likely to be interpreted as law articles or generally 
maritime law codes. Before the Rolls of Oléron, there were only regional customary 
regulations that differed from one region to another and these “earlier maritime laws 
than those of Oleron grew out of the custom of local port towns and generally had no 
greater regional appeal. The laws of Oleron, on the other hand, commanded a very 
widespread audience and in time became the canon for Europe‟s northern seas. The 
earlier form of the Rolls consisted of twenty-four or twenty-six articles”.101 
Topics in these documents vary over a small range, but in general they tried 
to regulate the legal relations between shipmaster, merchant and crew. Liabilities of 
captain to crew, shipmaster to ship-owner and issues like this mentioned maybe not 
in detail but with a clarity that people, who were involved to maritime transactions, 
did not have before. All these articles were only in the form of written versions of 
maritime customs that were found appropriate by royal authorities before the 
fourteenth century. In 1351, in a case, which was tried in Bristol, the legal position of 
the Rolls of Oléron was ratified as law for the first time.102 On the other hand, this 
cornerstone document (any of the abovementioned versions) does not give any 
evidence about the origins of maritime contract law. In addition to the absence of 
contractual regulations, the document did not contain any article related with piracy 
and how shipmaster or crew should act after a piratical attempt. But still, it is 
understandable for a document like the Rolls of Oléron to cover the performers‟ 
relations and liabilities to each other since these are the most basic issues of maritime 
trade and when the time of this document is considered, the ordinary way to go step 
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by step is starting from these basic points. Yet, in the form of liabilities, Rolls of 
Oléron includes what to do by shipowners in case of a threat at sea that gives damage 
to the vessel and causes the loss of vessel entirely or loss of merchandise. As one of 
the first and trend setting experts in the area, Timothy Runyan has interpreted this 
share of loss by shipowners or the link between master and crew as a contractual 
one
103
 but, this contractual relationship, although this was affected by piratical 
attempts demonstrably, was not the one which was made between two parties as 
buyer and seller for a secure commerce, but the one related with wages and labor 
responsibilities. However, this kind of contractual tie proves that piracy had an effect 
on the development of maritime law (in general not in terms of contracts in 
particular) in a way that can be seen through the code of Oléron.  
In addition, when organizing maritime activities in late medieval England, the 
Rolls of Oléron picked a sample commercial branch, namely the wine trade 
predominantly with Gascony.
104
 Most of the articles in the code used the wine trade 
to show instances of what should be done and this gave the chance to comprehend 
the importance of the wine trade even for the legal authority. This brought the idea of 
a relationship between the Southampton political elite and maritime law to mind. As 
explained before in other two sections, Southampton had such administrator- 
merchants that their variety in terms of sub-identities never ended. In the first 
chapter, they were seen as the most prominent units of the fifteenth-century 
Southampton wine trade and in the second chapter, it was seen that they could also 
be thought of as parts of naval units or privateers because of their multi-identity. 
However, the maritime contract law that was used in Southampton in the fifteenth 
century could not be thought as directly related with them because of two main 
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reasons: firstly, both the Rolls of Oléron and the unwritten customs of maritime 
affairs were accepted and started to be used before the period of the fifteenth century 
political elite. Furthermore, when a dispute arose, the cases of these laws were tried 
by either admiralty law or common law (or according to principals of merchant law). 
Both of these legal branches were not directly open to external interference that 
might come up from a local authority (like the Southampton elite) which could be 
used before in merchant law. So, in the fifteenth century, maritime law (and naturally 
maritime contract law) was beyond the point these elites could reach with their 
political power. Secondly, it cannot be said so clearly that if they had the power to 
affect maritime law positively, they had any reasons to do so. Because they were 
bureaucrats, merchants and sometimes even privateers, it was hard to speculate about 
their desire for legal development. Since they were the biggest wine trade investors 
in Southampton, they might want a more protected and regulated trade, or they could 
prefer a more flexible legal authority for maritime affairs if they had privateer 
identities at the same time, because realization of the orders of the king would bring 
even more political power and influence after all. Consequently, the position or 
preference of the biggest wine traders of Southampton for maritime law was obscure. 
Until now, although the wine trade, piracy and maritime law correlation started to be 
visible with the Rolls of Oléron, there was not sufficient information to verify the 
same correlation with maritime contract law specifically.  
To continue with source analysis to search for a contract law-piracy tie, under 
the heading “Rules or Orders about Matters which Belong to the Admiralty” in the 
Black Book of Admiralty (of Twiss), there are parts which had not been covered by 
previous documents. This early but noteworthy record stated that “those who are 
indicated that the hold plea of hue and cry or bloodshed committed on salt water 
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within the flood mark, if they are thereof convicted, they shall be imprisoned for two 
years, and then shall be fined according to the pleasure of the king or the admiral”.105 
It was not an intersection point between records of piratical attempts and contract 
law again, but it stands as a useful account of a legal anti-piracy measure which was 
one of the earliest in the form of a collection of laws or namely a maritime code.  
During the fourteenth century, the inefficiency and insufficiency of Rolls of 
Oléron started to be more apparent. By defining it as a “code of law” Robin Ward 
states “Oléron became inadequate when confronted with the increasing complexity 
of fourteenth century commercial shipping. To cope with that, the Inquisition of 
Queenborough was set up by Edward III in 1375.”106 Therefore, it can be seen that 
Edward III, his admirals and other officers realized there was a gap. Since the 
fourteenth century was the time of Hundred Years War and Black Death, it is not 
very difficult to understand why Edward III wanted to regulate his maritime trade by 
taking judicial measures. To finance its needs in these hard times of war, the 
administration had to use international trade in order to continue to earn from taxes, 
and to sustain this, in the absence of the necessary jurisdictional framework, created 
the Inquisition.  
The Inquisition of Queenborough covered a very broad range of topics 
related with almost all aspects of maritime affairs including the jettison of cargo, the 
rate of crew wages and felonies at sea. Unlike the Rolls of Oléron, this document 
referred to piracy in a very general manner by stating  
Item, let inquiry be made concerning all thieves (or pirates) who rob at sea any 
of the subjects of our lord the king or any person of his allies, or in amity with 
him, or any being under his protection, the names of the pirates and of the 
owners of ships of the pirates, and of the masters thereof, and what goods they 
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have stolen, and of what value, and in whose hands they are come, and of all 
their maintainers, receivers, and comforters.
107
 
 
Although the Inquisition of Queenborough also covered articles relating to the law of 
contracts, it is mainly concerned with charter-parties rather than two-sided 
transaction contracts. In other words, the contractual content of this document was 
designed to protect capital investors of the same side between each other rather than 
organizing the liabilities and risk share of labor and investor from outside effects like 
piracy. Hence, although this document, which aimed to meet the requirements of the 
time, included both general statements on piracy and law of contracts, it does not 
give any evidence to support the relationship between piracy and contract law, but 
only indicates the first step of gradually increasing legal measures against piracy 
noticeably. 
 These two documents, the Rolls of Oléron and the Inquisition of 
Queenborough, were both applied to England generally; however, in the context of 
Southampton in the late middle ages there were also local legal written proofs of 
progress that look like at first sight only like fine-tunings, but when one considers the 
geographical and economic needs of Southampton, these documents were precisely 
to the point. One and most important of these documents is the Oak Book of 
Southampton, which had at least the same value with the previous documents. 
Moreover, it was more functional than the Rolls and the Inquisition because of being 
specific to the area.  
 The Oak Book of Southampton was a local maritime law code that covers 
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different branches that was needed in Southampton. An increase of frequency in 
mentioning contract law can be observed in the Oak Book. However, these instances 
concerning contracts were not clear (in terms of the type of contract) and should be 
interpreted like the ones at the footnotes of Oak Book which were written by 
Twiss.
108
 On a controversial usage of contract, he added an explanation for the time 
as “The origin of this phrase ' a charter-party ' is derived from the practice of writing 
out contracts on a paper or charter, and then cutting or otherwise dividing the paper 
into two part, so that either party to the contract should hold a moiety, 'una carta 
partida'.”109 Records and footnotes on these records, like this one, could be found 
several times in the Oak Book and even though there can be no separate regulation 
against piracy in local regulations over contracts or charter-parties, a visible amount 
of establishment in usage of contractual documents and development of contractual 
legal regulations both in the form of contract and charter-party could be easily 
realized. 
 In another part of the Oak Book, there is an important part which is granted by 
royal administration after Southampton was attacked by foreign pirates.
110
 At the 
time, they had to cope with all the burden of the Hundred Years War both in terms of 
military severity and effort for economic sustainability. This short part in the Oak 
Book of Southampton covered a grant from the king (Edward III) to the local 
administration of Southampton in order to enable them to finish the construction of 
town walls. Like other maritime code-like (not in form but in practice) documents of 
late medieval era, there was the same absence (not generally in the Oak Book but in 
this small part of it) of proof between contract law and piracy but another solid 
instance of legal awareness of sea banditry.  
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 In consequence, after the research through the maritime codes of late 
medieval England like the Black Book of the Admiralty (in general), Rolls of 
Oléron, Inquisition of Queenborough and Oak Book of Southampton, it would be 
difficult to prove the direct relation between piracy and contract law. These 
collective documents could only work as tools to mention two separate things: 
firstly, starting from the fourteenth century and continuing into the fifteenth century, 
maritime law codes of the period included a variety of references to contractual 
processes. These processes, which were organized in these documents, did not 
contain only buyer-seller type agreements, but also in detail contractual guidelines 
for the onboard responsibilities of all labor, and the onboard responsibilities of 
shipmaster and owner, how the investors share the risk with other charter-parties and 
how to handle the losses caused by inevitable damages (both for vessel and for 
merchandise). So, the first thing to say is that in late Middle Ages a more regular or 
organized contractual process came into maritime merchants‟ (and related 
occupations‟) lives to a degree that can be traced via maritime codes. 
 Secondly, these documents shows that piracy started to take part from the 
legal literature of the time. Maritime codes of the time indicated piracy as something 
to be well protected from and stipulated that pirates were to be caught and arrested. 
Before this era, or before the existence of these legal documents now seen as 
maritime codes, kings took individual measures against pirates that were all decided 
after specific cases of piratical attacks as was shown above in Chapter III. In separate 
accounts (the ones which are not included by any code or other collected documents 
that have common point of having same theme), like these in the Patent Rolls or in 
records of pleas, pirates, their exact crimes, victims and dates were indicated, but not 
because procedures required so (because there was no existing procedure), even 
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though they occur frequently. On the other hand, in the late medieval era, maritime 
law codes of all kinds covered the generalized, ready-to-use maritime law packages 
along with the singular documents that were still taking sporadic measures against 
piratical attempts. 
 However, the fact is, even though these legal documents give certain 
indications of the development of general contract law (mostly in the form of 
charter-parties) and to the development of a legal awareness of piracy, maritime 
codes cannot provide proofs of a close relationship between piracy and contract law 
and cannot be evidence of a full correlation. On the other side, the absence of this 
evidence in “codes” may not be the last hope of relating these two phenomena. Like 
the times before these codes, singular records might be relevant in order to show any 
direct tie between contractual processes and sea banditry.  
 A case where trade contracts and piracy intersected had been first 
experienced internationally approximately one century before fifteenth century, in 
1293. Two men, called William de Sant and Andrew Barrante attacked Portuguese 
and Spanish merchants while they are sailing from Castile to Flemish waters.
111
 
These merchants had been caught in unfortunate weather and eventually found 
themselves off the coast of Portsmouth. The two pirates attacked them there, took all 
of their merchandise and even persuaded the Sheriff of Southampton to arrest these 
merchants. Before the king in the court, the Portuguese and Spanish merchants tried 
to explain they had never been enemies of the king and they were just merchants of 
the company of Ricardi of Lucca. The reason why they tried to vindicate themselves 
from being enemies of the king was that the pleas of the two pirates or privateers 
(William and Andrew) tried to legitimize their action by labeling it as taking from 
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the king‟s enemies. Eventually, the king accepted the pirates‟ claim and allowed 
them to keep all the merchandise that they had stolen from the Iberian merchants on 
the condition of compensating the losses of the Duke of Bayonne who had also 
suffered damage from the actions of these pirates. In this case, there are a couple of 
things to interpret. As the first step, being members or employees of a company 
could be enough to see them as merchants who were working with contracts and 
charter-parties; however, the terms of these contracts and how these losses should be 
shared in case of a piratical attack were not mentioned. Hence, the contractual nature 
of this case was not clear, and because of this, the contracts cannot be related to the 
piratical attacks. On the other hand, as a second aspect, 1293 was a date that is too 
early for step-by-step reforms against anti-piratical legal measures. The consequence 
of the case (decision of the king) is sufficient to see primitiveness towards the 
exterritoriality of contracted international trade and rawness of anti-piratical legal 
procedures, still not as two correlated facts but two distinct fragment of economic-
legal area. 
 
3.3 Effect of Legal Branches 
 
 To illuminate the place of maritime law and contract law, it is better to 
understand their position in late medieval era and which branches of law they were in 
relation with. First place to start is better to be common law as one of the backbone 
legal branches in England. Common law was covering trade affairs or disputes, 
debts-loans and, as the most important aspect for us, contracts.
112
 As explained above 
in the section on contracts, all kinds of common law cases might be caused by verbal 
agreement disputes as well as written ones if the contract was important. These 
                                                        
112
 Ward, The World of the Medieval Shipmaster, 12 
 90 
 
written agreements in medieval common law were rare and expensive, and they were 
also called sealed agreements. Naturally, with the passing of time, common law and 
its relationship to oral and written agreements changed. It became more flexible in 
some respects but less tolerant in others. For example, it was hard to break any 
sealed document and there was nothing to do if a party of agreement would lose half 
of his sealed document.
113
 He would remain a debtor even if he had previously paid. 
These kinds of new approaches started to emerge in late medieval times when the 
common law became preferred place of jurisdiction for these contractual matters; 
until that time it was the merchant law (or Lex Mercatoria) as a messy legal structure 
in an strange unity.  
 Merchant law has always been quite complex. It was quite suitable for 
England‟s legal tradition because it relied on customs and precedents as was usual in 
the legal background of the country. The reign of merchant law was most glorious 
before it was swallowed by common law. The principles of merchant law came from 
the origin of the Lex Mercatoria a compilation of commercial traditions. This branch 
of the English legal structure did not work as a criminal investigation and 
punishment authority in the commercial field. It focused on how it could protect 
merchants and how it could sustain the existing trade so the basic element was the 
ownership of merchants of their commodity and protecting these merchants and their 
commodities from existing external dangers.
114
 The Statute of Staple, which will be 
described further below, was covered by merchant law and this was a fourteenth-
century tool in order to create a certain amount of regularity both in all kinds of 
commercial affairs and more specifically to contracts. After the fourteenth century, it 
was replaced by the common law, as what is described as developments in contract 
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law in this peace, which resulted in the replacement of local courts by more general, 
state-level common law court. The Lex Mercatoria still existed in the fifteenth 
century, but now under the heading of common law.  
 Maritime law or admiralty law, on the other hand, changes the dimension of 
the issue concerning late medieval maritime contract law. For a long time, the basis 
of English maritime law was the Rolls of Oléron. After England embraced these 
articles as appropriate maritime procedures, new legal documents like Inquisition of 
Queenborough were introduced. Indeed, all of these newly introduced documents 
were created because of one single, main reason: need. The Black Book of the 
Admiralty covers various different documents that were used by English maritime 
regulations and all of these important instances of maritime law came with absence 
of organizational body or theoretical framework like a legal basis and certain need of 
these for the sake of protecting maritime commerce, as the most profitable aspect of 
English economy from a very tempestuous international political arena. When the 
issue comes to the jurisdiction of admiralty law, it tended to construct its own area of 
influence by taking all maritime matters from other disciplines. However, since other 
disciplines were much more grounded than admiralty law, a clash occurred between 
common law and admiralty law for maritime trade, at least for maritime contract, 
even admiralty law succeeded to take other maritime branches from other legal 
disciplines like piracy from criminal law. Therefore, contract law (maritime contract 
law) was at the middle of these three abovementioned law branches and its belonging 
or impendence shifted with time to one another because of internal changes within 
the branches of these three law disciplines. This vague nature could be both traced 
from the maritime codes and singular records and lies as the reason why the 
 92 
 
correlation between piracy and contract law of the term cannot be shown with a clear 
manner.  
 Before the fifteenth century, in 1361, a Flanders vessel was recorded carrying 
merchandise worth 20,000 l. (presumably French livre)
115
 Pirates spotted her 
existence and captured this ship. After king heard about this occasion he ordained his 
men for the establishment of a commission whose duty was to find the pirates and 
arrest them. However, this commission was established according to the common 
law of the time. Following this, in the same year, an order of cancellation came from 
the royal office. This cancellation stated that this case could not be undertaken by 
English common law because it was a maritime affair and it should be investigated 
according to maritime law by admirals.  
 Later, in 1476, the king appointed his men “to enquire into divers, 
spoliations, robberies and breaches of safe-conducts and truces between the king and 
foreign princes committed at sea by James Hayne and his accomplices, now on 
prison in Newcastle on Tyne, and to chastise and punish them according to maritime 
law and custom, at a court of Admiralty”.116  (my italics) This is a very strong 
instance of the development of maritime law in general. Contract was not indicated 
in this record at all, yet it should be mentioned under this heading. Because, apart 
from a certain provable improvement in anti-piracy law, this account indicated 
another important point in order to assess where the problem is in relating the piracy 
and contract law. The answer is hidden in the phrase of court of Admiralty in this 
record, in another words, difference in area of jurisdiction of branches of legal 
offices. 
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 Therefore, during late medieval English legal history (and Southampton in 
particular) it was not very clear where to send which case, and jurisdictions of 
common law and maritime law were two distinct entities.
117
 When the issue comes to 
the disputes related with maritime trade contracts, there comes the clash of the 
jurisdictions and Lex Mercatoria became a special sphere that is worth mentioning as 
another smaller but more international category. If the relation between piracy and 
contract law is interpreted in the light of these jurisdictional clashes, it might be 
natural for one to be unable to indicate any solid proof of this relation because of 
being cases of separate courts.  
 Lex Mercatoria and its blurred nature about the jurisdictional processes 
enable kings and their offices to create some written documents to obey which 
explain the contractual processes and also could be implemented by maritime affairs. 
The earliest is the Statute of Merchants in 1283 which did not last long (its efficiency 
was questionable as well) and was followed by the Statute of Staple in 1353.
118
 The 
Statute of Staple was a regulation attempt of merchant law. It was one of the last 
attempts related with contractual matters because common law took over where 
merchant law left around fourteenth century. However, related with contractual 
organization and ownership matters (which were to be used in pleas to the court in 
order to demand return of the commodities in case of robbery on sea), the Statute of 
Staple remained as a key source for a long time. It had the features of a legal reform 
in merchant law and Ward sums that up as  
The new courts‟ procedure, the law to be applied and the control by the 
merchants themselves, reflected the procedures that prevailed all over the 
continent… however, there was a further innovation…after the Statute of the 
Staple, English merchant law was prepared to accept the concept of good faith, 
including unsealed letters recognizing debt. This adaptability of merchant law 
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was especially important in the development of acceptance of negotiable 
instruments.
119
  
 
Although this shows the importance of the Statute theoretically for its time, it is 
better to see the practical function and where it stands in the relation between piracy 
and commercial legal structure. 
  In a record of 1371, a commission of the king was recorded which helps one 
to understand the regularity of fifteenth-century contractual cases in piracy and this 
record also lies as one of the best points of intersection between piracy and contract 
law.
120
 In this record, a bailiff of Shoreham found a vessel, which was previously 
captured by pirates, and arrested these pirates. When it came to the question of what 
to do with the merchandise, which had been stolen by the pirates, the king explained 
what was to be done by saying that if the ownership of the merchants could be 
proven by “producing marks, charter-party or cocket, or the word of good and lawful 
merchant” then these goods would be returned to these merchants immediately. 
These ownership-proving techniques were all taken from the Statute of Staples and 
regularities, which ought to be, and enlighten how the Lex Mercatoria would react to 
secure a contractor against a piratical case. At the same time, this Close Rolls record 
mentioned explicitly the requirement to obey the rules and customs that were 
previously determined by the Statute of Staple. Although the Statute of Staple 
showed the legal aftermath of a piratical attack for contractors before contract law, it 
could not be thought of as a development that might be seen in every single contract 
between two merchants. It was a general improvement not only in contract law but 
also generally in commercial law, with the name of the period Lex Mercatoria.  
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 At the end of this chapter, a number of conclusions can be proposed: firstly, 
piracy cannot be said to be one of the factors in the improvement of late medieval 
contract law, neither in England overall nor in Southampton specifically. At least, 
this causal relationship cannot be proved. The only thing that might be said relating 
to piracy is that it is possible to speculate that it was one of the contributing factors 
to the regularization of contract law because of its significance and frequency. 
Starting from the thirteenth century onwards, wine piracy existed on English Channel 
in all its intensity and frequency as can be traced from singular records such as the 
ones in Patent Rolls and Close Rolls. It went on similarly throughout the fifteenth 
century with the exception of the reign of Henry V. Concurrently, starting from 
thirteenth century as well, maritime law (or admiralty law), common law and Lex 
Mercatoria developed substantially and continued to do so in the fifteenth century 
which can be observed by looking Rolls of Oléron or Inquisition of Queenborough 
for England and Oak Book of Southampton for the southern gate. With the parallel 
development of these two existing spheres, and by considering the common ground 
of maritime wine trade, piracy could be assumed to be one of the stepping stones for 
general development of contract and more generally commercial law, because of the 
need of taking measures in order to avoid from it. On the other hand, this assumption 
can hardly be more than an (well-founded) interpretation, because of the lack of 
direct accounts that link the development of contract law to piracy. 
 Secondly, during the search for a relationship between contract law and 
piracy, it has been revealed that the frequency of piracy until and during fifteenth 
century helped developed legal anti-piracy measures both in England and in 
Southampton. General maritime codes, the Oak Book of Southampton and all 
singular accounts related with Southampton and England as a whole, include 
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frequent piratical attempts in different damage scales and aiming different trades, 
especially wine trade and eventually it demonstrably caused the development of anti-
piracy since pirates started to give harm to wine trade more than an average war. 
Like anxiety of global warming caused more sensible filtration policies in industries 
in all countries or like positive effect of new illnesses on medical technology and 
inventions compulsorily, practical instances of piracy enable a bureaucratic and 
jurisdictional development in theory level.   
 As one of the most important philosophers and theorists Michel Foucault 
constructed a theory in his piece of The Birth of Biopolitics with various well-
organized and fascinating ideas related with European economic settlement and how 
that started to evolve. Naturally, none of these ideas are related with late medieval 
English economic standing, wine trade or piracy but related with the creation of a 
new political-economic structure in Europe starting with eighteenth century. He 
supports his argument with maritime law and effect of piracy examples from modern 
era, in order to explain how “overall European economy” should be seen. In the 
conclusion part, it should be observed that how his ideas work for medieval 
economic structure of wine trade, piracy and legal organization triangle, by not 
presenting an entirely new idea but making last remarks by using tools of Foucault in 
order to explain whole aim of this medieval relation-building. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
In the medieval period, during the times of the Hundred Years War, the 
phenomenon of the economy‟s effect on political sustainability were not very 
different than how it was constructed by Foucault in his theories. As the two main 
belligerents, England and France tried to prepare themselves for the next battle and 
tried to avoid war exhaustion both in terms of sociopolitical and economic aspects.
121
 
The northwest of the continental Europe and the islands above it were too small for 
these two geographic allies to share the power. War broke out because of the claim 
of the throne and continued with an immense clash of military and economic power. 
It should also be noted that military power has always been somewhat based on 
economic capacity. Therefore, wars were evolving from ones that were tied to the 
courage of soldiers into the ones that were financed, waged and bought. To put it 
another way, the only way to win a war was not the glory of battle. There have been 
alternative ways, which were solidly known by England and France, like attacking to 
the conditions that gave the chance to continue to this war to the king, namely 
economic wellbeing. In Foucault‟s identification of mercantilism and international 
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commerce balances, this would not only give the damage to others‟ fundamental 
sustainer but also provide utilization from absent part of market for the attacker state. 
This was the beginning of our story. 
Since in the meantime, an important source of income was trade for England, 
it was very natural to think of trade as the first target in case of a war scenario such 
as the Hundred Years War. Within the trade, wine was a vital commodity because of 
high demand and availability for most of the society. Southampton was the southern 
gate of this wine trade for England because it was the key point to send this wine 
both by sea or land. Through the fifteenth-century port records of Southampton, it 
can be seen that most of the abovementioned wine trade was in the hands of a local 
elite who held political positions and worked as merchants as well. Regardless of 
highness of this administrative positions, they enjoyed the advantage of having 
connections and all kinds of administrative links that could be used. Eventually, they 
became the primary wine traders of Southampton in the fifteenth century both in 
local wine trade and internationally. 
After seeing this great source of tax income for England in Southampton, it 
would not be hard to appreciate that the first income to cut off was the trade income 
for international bodies who were enemies of England, like France. This followed the 
reign of piracy in late medieval English Channel. As stated above, piracy was the 
prominent cause of the state of terror on the seas in the fourteenth century during the 
war. Because, piracy, by its nature, is a product of crisis. In addition, as Foucault 
said
122
, to cut the financer of military costs, both of the belligerents used privateers 
whose harm to international trade added to the one by pirates and created an even 
more dramatic scenario of commerce on sea. In the second chapter, it is argued that 
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piracy and privateering continued during the fifteenth century and rose 
proportionally with the developing wine trade in the English Channel until and after 
the reign of Henry V. Even Henry‟s efforts reduced the frequency and damage of 
sea-banditry, it returned and continued with all its malevolence as can be seen in the 
records of Southampton and generally in England.  
The legal situation, more specifically contract law, was the last chapter 
relating to the piracy and indirectly wine trade. In order to prove this relation, which 
indicates that piracy was one of the causes of the development of contract law in 
Southampton and England, both contemporary maritime codes and individual 
records related with maritime affairs and its legal reflections were scrutinized. 
However, it was seen that none of these records could prove this causality or 
correlation between sea-banditry and contract law. The only fact we can see clearly, 
in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, when piracy became deeper and started to 
be more and more influential, contract law was in a development phase in a parallel 
to this deepening of piracy. On the other hand, records could not serve us in order to 
discover any intersection points of these two parallel lines. 
On the other hand, two other relevant and useful consequences can be 
reached within from the information that is given by these records. Firstly, although 
this relation between piracy and contract law cannot be proven, because of the 
existing parallelism between these two phenomena, piracy can be interpreted as one 
of the determinants that had a positive effect on the development of contract law. It 
is, in fact, a very straight logic: when piratical attempts caused great loss to 
merchants‟ capitals, there should be a solution for merchants to avoid such losses in 
some way. Contracts were accomplished verbally before improvements of contract 
law. However, after the effects of piracy, the need to prove ownership of 
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commodities and the right to demand compensation for losses according to articles of 
this contract, directed people to pass to written agreements for a more legally 
regulated trade. Hence, to certify these legal rights, mostly designed as measures 
against piracies, contract law was developed to a more organized level. 
Secondly, from the maritime records of Southampton and England, the direct 
effect of piracy on maritime law emerged as a consequence that could be proven. 
While only the Statute of Staple shows evidence about the relation between contract 
law and piracy relation, nearly all of maritime codes of England, Oak Book of 
Southampton and most of the singular maritime records indicate that sea-banditry 
created an improvement because of the depth of negative effects of piratical 
attempts. Therefore, piracy was the determinant of the improvement of general 
maritime law, whereas its effect on contract law can only be an assumption. 
To see the triangular relationship of wine trade, piracy and law (not 
necessarily commercial but maritime law), the exemplification of Foucault stands as 
the best (despite the fault that it is actually related with eighteenth century 
circumstances) by putting this as  
Take, for example, the history of maritime law in the eighteenth century, and 
the way in which, in terms of international law, there was an attempt to think 
of the world, or at least the sea, as the space of free competition, of free 
maritime circulation, and consequently as on of the necessary conditions for 
the organization of a world market. The history of piracy –the way in which it 
was at once used, encouraged, combated, and suppressed, etcetera- could also 
figure as one of the aspects of this elaboration of a worldwide space in terms 
of a number of legal principles. We can say that there was a juridification of 
the world which should be thought of in terms of the organization of a 
market.
123
 
 
To put it in different words, Foucault underlines the relation between piracy and the 
legal sphere by also mentioning their relevance with international maritime trade and 
                                                        
123
 Ibid., 56 
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putting a theoretical-political correlation between those if not a historically tractable 
or provable one. The bureaucratic elite of the Southampton wine trade, their multiple 
identities as administrators, merchants and time-to-time privateers, the increase in 
piracy in the English Channel and its benefitting from the chaos of Hundred Years 
War and finally the development of maritime law (if maritime law of commerce it is 
assumable, if generally maritime law it is observable), were all interrelated and stood 
as an important ring of the chain between the political, economic and military arenas.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Trade Volumes of Political-Merchants in Late Medieval Southampton 
 
 
 
*Amounts above are in medieval unit of volume “tun” which is close to modern ton.  
*Years of available port books of Southampton which were chosen as three sample 
years to reflect first half of fifteenth century.  
 
Year* Peter James 
Walter 
Fetplace 
John Emery John Pain 
Robert 
Eylward 
William 
Nicole 
1427-28 38.5* 65 16.5 4 7 35.5 
1435-36 53 12 27.5 24.5 14.5 17 
1439-40 45 2 2 4.5 15 10 
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APPENDIX B 
 
A List of Administrator-Merchants Transactions from the Port Records of 1469-71 
 
MERCHANT VESSEL MASTER DATE CU* CR* AN* AMOUNT 
Avanne, Thomas, burgess Boat of Thomas Shelow - 
12 October 
1469 
0 2d - 1 butt 
Avanne, Thomas, burgess Boat of Thomas Avanne - 
17 October 
1469 
0 
1s 
8d 
- 5 tuns 
Tregas, Phelyph Boat of Thomas Benyth Thomas Benyth 
25 October 
1469 
0 0 - 
7 barrels of 
sweet wine 
William, Walter, burgess Boat of John Shepard - 
7 November 
1469 
0 
1s 
3d 
- 
3 tuns and 3 
hogsheads 
Blewet, Robert Boat of William Eylys - 
9 November 
1469 
0 4d - 1 tun 
Avanne, Thomas, burgess Boat of William Eylys - 
9 November 
1469 
0 4d - 1 tun 
Avanne, Thomas, burgess Boat of William Short - 
17 November 
1469 
0 
1s 
5d 
- 
4 tuns and 1 
hogshead 
Walker, John, burgess 
Boat of John Walker, 
burgess 
- 
19 November 
1469 
0 
2s 
4d 
- 7 tuns 
Asse, Richard Boat of John Fryday - 
19 November 
1469 
0 2s - 7 tuns 
1
0
7
 
 
 108 
 
Asse, Richard Boat of John Fryday - 
19 November 
1469 
0 0 - 5 barrels 
Asse, Richard Boat of John Fryday - 
19 November 
1469 
0 3d - 3 hogsheads 
Avanne, Thomas, burgess Boat of Thomas Shelow - 
20 November 
1469 
0 
1s 
7d 
- 
4 tuns and 3 
hogsheads 
Avanne, Thomas, burgess Boat of Thomas Shelow - 
20 November 
1469 
0 - - 2 barrels 
Asshe, Richard  and  Saunders, 
William (burgess) 
Lodwyco de Lapaley 
Richard Asshe and 
William Saunders 
(burgess) 
28 November 
1469 
0 5s 4d 15 tuns 
Tregas, Phelyph (burgess) Lodwyco de Lapaley 
Richard Asshe and 
William Saunders 
(burgess) 
28 November 
1469 
0 
3s 
4d 
4d 10 tuns 
James, Walter (burgess) Lodwyco de Lapaley 
Richard Asshe and 
William Saunders 
(burgess) 
28 November 
1469 
0 
1 s 
2d 
4d 7 pipes 
Raynold, Thomas (burgess) Lodwyco de Lapaley 
Richard Asshe and 
William Saunders 
(burgess) 
28 November 
1469 
0 4s 4d 12 tuns 
Tregas, Phelyph (burgess) Ship of Richard Asshe Gerard Baker 
28 November 
1469 
0 5s 0 15 tuns 
Walker, John, burgess Ship of Richard Asshe Gerard Baker 
28 November 
1469 
0 5s 0 15 tuns 
Raynold, Thomas (burgess) Ship of Richard Asshe Gerard Baker 
28 November 
1469 
0 5s 0 15 tuns 
Blewet, Robert (burgess) Ship of Richard Asshe Gerard Baker 
28 November 
1469 
0 
3s 
4d 
0 10 tuns 
1
0
8
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Saunders, William (burgess) Ship of Richard Asshe Gerard Baker 
28 November 
1469 
0 1s 0 3 tuns 
William, Walter, burgess Boat of John Shepard - 
2 December 
1469 
0 2d - 1 pipe 
Tregas, Phelyph (burgess) 
Boat of John Whale of 
Hasting 
- 
5 December 
1469 
0 5d - 
1 tun and 1 
hogshead 
Avanne, Thomas, burgess 
Boat of T. A Vanne 
(burgess) 
- 
10 December 
1469 
0 2d 0 1 pipe 
Walker, John, burgess Boat of Henry Shipman - 
15 December 
1469 
0 10d - 5 pipes 
Avanne, Thomas, burgess Boat of Henry Shipman - 
15 December 
1469 
0 2d - 1 pipe 
Avanne, Thomas, burgess 
Ship of Thomas A 
Vanne 
William Harre 
3 January 
1470 
0 4s 0 12 tuns  
Eynys, Lodwyco (burgess) 
Ship of Thomas A 
Vanne 
William Harre 
3 January 
1470 
0 
2s 
4d 
0 7 tuns 
William, Walter, burgess Boat of Richard Sprynge - 
21 January 
1470 
0 2d - 1 pipe 
Avanne, Thomas, burgess 
Boat of T. A Vanne 
(burgess) 
- 
25 January 
1470 
0 
2s 
1d 
- 
6 tuns and 1 
hogshead 
Avanne, Thomas, burgess 
Boat of T. A Vanne 
(burgess) 
- 
25 January 
1470 
0 0 - 3 barrels 
Asshe, Richard (burgess) Boat of John Shepard - 
1 February 
1470 
0 2d - 1 pipe 
Pain, Thomas (burgess) A ship Roger Phelyp 
4 February 
1470 
0 
1s 
9d 
4d 
5 tuns and 1 
hogshead 
Walker, John, burgess 
Boat of Richard 
Middleton 
Richard Middleton 
6 February 
1470 
0 1d - 1 hogshead 
1
0
9
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Asshe, Richard (burgess) Boat of Richard Luffe - 
8 February 
1470 
0 2d - 1 pipe 
Walker, John, burgess A ship Alyn Asshe 
13 February 
1470 
0 4d - 
2 butts and 1 
barrel 
Eyermys, Lodwyco (burgess) A ship Bernardo Dyssysworthe 
20 February 
1470 
0 
2s 
4d 
- 7 tuns 
Avanne, Thomas, burgess A ship Bernardo Dyssysworthe 
20 February 
1470 
0 2s - 6 tuns 
Gerard, Robert A ship Bernardo Dyssysworthe 
20 February 
1470 
0 5s - 15 tuns 
Walker, John, burgess Ship of Richard Eylys John Rately 
12 March 
1470 
0 
4s 
2d 
0 25 butts 
Tehy, Vincent Boat of John Shepard - 
12 March 
1470 
0 4d - 1 tun 
Asshe, Richard (burgess) Boat of Peryn of Hythe - 
26 March 
1470 
0 4d - 1 tun 
Walker, John, burgess Boat of Alyn Asshe Alyn Asshe 
26 March 
1470 
0 2d - 1 butt 
Walker, John, burgess Boat of William Short - 
11 April 
1470 
0 1d - 1 hogshead 
Clementes, Antonie (burgess) Boat of John Shepard - 
16 April 
1470 
0 1d - 1 hogshead 
Asshe, Richard (burgess) Boat of Peryn of Hythe - 
19 April 
1470 
0 2d - 1 pipe 
Walker, John, burgess A ship John Rately of Lemyngton 7 May 1470 0 
2s 
4d 
0 14 butts 
Avanne, Thomas, burgess Boat of Tomas Benyth - 8 May 1470 0 4d - 1 tun 
1
1
0
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Avanne, Thomas,  burgess Boat of John Woderove - 12 May 1470 0 3d - 
2 hogsheads 
and 1 barrel 
Raynold, Thomas (burgess) 
Boat of John Mathew of 
Fyssheborn 
- 15 May 1470 0 1d - 1 hogshead 
Shropshere, John (burgess) Boat of John Baker - 5 June 1470 0 1d - 1 hogshead 
Avanne, Thomas, burgess Boat of John Fryday - 6 June 1470 0 
1s 
6d 
- 
4 tuns and 1 
pipe 
Gerard, Robert (burgess) Boat of John Shepard - 8 June 1470 0 2d - 
1 barrel and 1 
pipe 
Pain, Thomas (burgess) A boat Richard Regeler 9 July 1470 0 4d 2d 1 tun 
Avanne, Thomas, burgess Boat of Alyn Emery - 18 July 1470 0 2d - 1 pipe 
Walker, John, burgess 
Boat of John Walker, 
burgess 
- 20 July 1470 0 10d - 
5 butts of 
sweet wine 
Saunders, William (burgess) 
Boat of John Walker, 
burgess 
- 20 July 1470 0 2d - 1 butt 
Tehy, Vincent Boat of John Shepard - 20 July 1470 0 2d - 1 pipe 
Walker, John, burgess Boat of John Fryday - 
1 August 
1470 
0 1s - 3 tuns 
William, Walter, burgess Boat of John Shepard - 
6 August 
1470 
4d 4d - 1 tun 
Avanne, Thomas, burgess Boat of John Mathew - 
17 September 
1470 
0 4d - 1 tun 
Compayn, Victor (burgess) A Galley Francesco de San Matheo 
 
0 4d 0 
2 butts of 
sweet wine 
1
1
1
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Walker, John, burgess A ship William Cokhes of Fowy 
9,10,11 April 
1471 
0 
1s 
4d 
- 
8 butts of 
sweet wine 
Avanne, Thomas, burgess 
Boat of Henry Smith of 
Kingston 
- 
25 April 
1471 
0 4d - 2 butts 
Avanne, Thomas, burgess Boat of Tomas Benyth - 
11,12 May 
1471 
0 2s - 6 tuns 
Pain, Thomas (burgess) 
Boat of Henry Amlyn of 
Chichester 
- 18 May 1471 0 2d - 1 pipe 
Avanne, Thomas, burgess 
Boat of Henry Amlyn of 
Chichester 
- 18 May 1471 0 1s - 3 tuns 
Pain, Thomas (burgess) 
Boat of John Mathew of 
Fyssheborn 
- 
21,22 May 
1471 
0 
1s 
6d 
- 
4 tuns and 1 
pipe 
Avanne, Thomas, burgess Boat of Davy Whyte - 8 June 1471 0 4d - 
2 butts of 
sweet wine 
Walker, John, burgess Boat of Thomas Benyth - 11 June 1471 0 2d - 1 butt 
Eynes, Laurens (burgess) Boat of Laurens Eynes  - 11 June 1471 0 
1s 
2d 
- 
3 tuns and 1 
pipe 
Leuerzege, Thomas (burgess) Ship of Philip Bylote John Retirle 
18,19 June 
1471 
0 2d - 1 pipe 
Avanne, Thomas, burgess 
Boat of Henry Amlyn of 
Chichester 
- 22 June 1471 0 1d - 1 hogshead 
Clement, Antony (burgess) Boat of John Sprynge - 28 June 1471 0 2d - 1 pipe 
Pedelden, Vincent (burgess) A ship of Portsmouth Wat' Gibson 1 July 1471 0 
2s 
4d 
0 7 tuns 
Blewet, Robert (burgess) A ship of Portsmouth Wat' Gibson 1 July 1471 0 
2s 
2d 
0 
6 tuns and 1 
pipe 
1
1
2
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Avanne, Thomas, burgess A ship of Portsmouth Wat' Gibson 1 July 1471 0 6d 0 3 pipes 
They, Vincent (burgess) A ship of Portsmouth Wat' Gibson 1 July 1471 0 
2s 
2d 
0 
6 tuns and 1 
pipe 
Eynes, Laurens (burgess) Boat of Laurens Eynes - 4 July 1471 0 5d - 
1 tun and 1 
hogshead 
Jonson, William (burgess) Boat of Dauy Whyte - 8 July 1471 0 8d - 2 tuns 
Avanne, Thomas, burgess 
Boat of Henry Amlyn of 
Chichester 
- 9 July 1471 0 2d - 1 butt 
Avanne, Thomas, burgess 
Boat of Henry Amlyn of 
Chichester 
- 9 July 1471 0 3d - 
1 pipe and 1 
hogshead 
Avanne, Thomas, burgess 
Boat of Richard Periss 
of Bosam 
- 13 July 1471 0 2d - 1 butt 
Walter, John (burgess) 
Boat of John Luffe of 
Heth 
- 19 July 1471 0 2d - 1 pipe 
Avanne, Thomas, burgess 
Boat of William Schorte 
of Lankeston 
- 
1,2 August 
1471 
0 11d - 
5 pipes and 1 
hogshead 
Walter, John (burgess) 
Boat of John Walker, 
burgess 
- 
9 August 
1471 
0 1s - 3 tuns 
Saunders, William (burgess) Boat of Wat' James - 
10 August 
1471 
0 4d - 
2 butts of 
sweet wine 
Avanne, Thomas, burgess 
Boat of Henry Amlyn of 
Chichester 
- 
14 August 
1471 
0 1s - 3 tuns 
Avanne, Thomas, burgess 
Boat of John Vyncorte 
of Heth 
- 
2 September 
1471 
0 8d - 2 tuns 
Avanne, Thomas, burgess 
Boat of Henry Amlyn of 
Chichester 
- 
5 September 
1471 
0 10d - 
2 tuns and 1 
pipe 
1
1
3
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Avanne, Thomas, burgess 
Boat of Henry Amlyn of 
Chichester 
- 
5 September 
1471 
0 - - 4 barrels 
Avanne, Thomas, burgess Boat of William Smith - 
7 September 
1471 
0 2d 2d 
1 butt of 
sweet wine 
Eynes, Laurens (burgess) 
Boat of Peter de 
Caleysse 
- 
8 September 
1471 
0 4d - 2 pipes 
Avanne, Thomas, burgess 
Boat of John Shepard of 
Newporte 
- 
15 September 
1471 
0 2d - 1 pipe 
Tehy, Vincent (burgess) A carrack Baltizar Scorcifficus 
2 December 
1470 
0 4d 
3s 
4d 
2 butts 
 
 
*CU stands for the local customs that were taken for the amount of wine that was transacted and CR symbolizes the cranage fee to 
unload same amount. AN, on the other side, is the anchorage fee that should be paid once for the ship. 
 1
1
4
 
 
